University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Kreisman Working Paper Series in Housing Law and
Policy

Working Papers

2013

Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial
Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market
Tomasz Piskorski
Amit Seru
James Witkin

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
housing_law_and_policy
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
Recommended Citation
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & James Witkin, "Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS
Market" (Kreisman Working Papers Series in Housing Law and Policy No. 9, 2013).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Kreisman Working Paper Series in Housing Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
KREISMAN WORKING PAPER ON HOUSING LAW AND POLICY NO. 9

ASSET QUALITY MISREPRESENTATION BY FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES: EVIDENCE FROM RMBS MARKET
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, and James Witkin

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
February 2013
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Kreisman Working Papers Series in Housing Law
and Policy: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/housing_law_and_policy_wp/
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries:
Evidence from RMBS Market
Tomasz Piskorski
Columbia GSB
Amit Seru
University of Chicago and NBER
James Witkin
February 2013
ABSTRACT
We contend that buyers received false information about the true quality of assets in contractual
disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages in the $2 trillion non-agency market.
We construct two measures of misrepresentation of asset quality -- misreported occupancy status
of borrower and misreported second liens -- by comparing the characteristics of mortgages
disclosed to the investors at the time of sale with actual characteristics of these loans at that time
that are available in a dataset matched by a credit bureau. About one out of every ten loans has
one of these misrepresentations. These misrepresentations are not likely to be an artifact of
matching error between datasets that contain actual characteristics and those that are reported to
investors. At least part of this misrepresentation likely occurs within the boundaries of the
financial industry (i.e., not by borrowers). The propensity of intermediaries to sell misrepresented
loans increased as the housing market boomed, peaking in 2006. These misrepresentations are
costly for investors, as ex post delinquencies of such loans are more than 60% higher when
compared with otherwise similar loans. Lenders seem to be partly aware of this risk, charging a
higher interest rate on misrepresented loans relative to otherwise similar loans, but the interest
rate markup on misrepresented loans does not fully reflect their higher default risk. Using
measures of pricing used in the literature, we find no evidence that these misrepresentations were
priced in the securities at their issuance. A significant degree of misrepresentation exists across
all reputable intermediaries involved in sale of mortgages. The propensity to misrepresent seems
to be largely unrelated to measures of incentives for top management, to quality of risk
management inside these firms or to regulatory environment in a region. Misrepresentations on
just two relatively easy-to-quantify dimensions of asset quality could result in forced repurchases
of mortgages by intermediaries up to $160 billion.
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Section I: Introduction
Market rules and regulations that require disclosure of information and prohibit misleading
statements on the financial products being manufactured by intermediaries play an important role
in the functioning of capital markets. However, the nature of intermediation has changed
dramatically over the past decade–with the introduction of more agents in the supply chain of
credit (see Keys et al. forthcoming)--potentially weakening the ability of existing market
arrangements and regulatory oversight in ensuring truthful disclosure of asset quality. This
concern has gained momentum in the aftermath of the crisis, with a precipitous decline in the
value of supposedly safe securities as well as large investor losses. 1 This paper adds to this
debate, and more generally to one on the design of market rules and future financial regulation,
by quantifying the extent to which buyers may have received false information about the true
quality of these assets by sellers of these securities and by exploring factors that may have
moderated such behavior by financial intermediaries.
Our study focuses on misrepresentation of asset-quality that consist of securities collateralized by
residential mortgages that are originated without government guarantees (non-agency RMBS) -representing a $2 trillion market in 2007. 2 These misrepresentations are not instances of the
classic asymmetric information problem in which the buyers know less than the seller. Rather,
we contend that they are instances where, in the process of contractual disclosure by the sellers,
buyers received false information on the characteristics of assets. We identify misrepresentations
by comparing the characteristics of mortgages in the pool that were disclosed to the investors at
the time of sale with actual characteristics of these loans at the same time and show that such
misrepresentations constitute a significant proportion of the loans. We investigate if lenders and
investors were aware of such behavior and assess characteristics of intermediaries involved in
the sale of assets, such as incentives for managers, that could have moderated this behavior. In
doing so we demonstrate the limits of existing market and regulatory arrangements in preventing
such behavior in the capital market.
The RMBS securitization process involves aggregating mortgages into loan trusts, either through
direct origination or indirect acquisition, and using their underlying cash flows to issue securities.
The sale of these securities is organized by underwriters who, as part of this process, must collect
and verify information regarding the quality of the underlying collateral backing these securities.
The underwriters in this market are large, reputable financial intermediaries who are considered
to be more sophisticated than the buyers in this market, which are typically institutional investors
1

Critics of imposing more regulation argue that reputational concerns of large, well-established financial
intermediaries would prevent such violations of investors’ rights. In contrast, proponents of increased regulation
argue that more regulation was needed since intermediaries were able to exploit investors despite their reputation
(and existing regulation).
2
See Agarwal and Ho (2007), and Keys et al. (2012), and the Federal Reserve Board March 2009 Statistical Release
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/mortoutstand20090331.htm)
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such as pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies. Thus, given the lighter regulatory
oversight relative to public capital markets that are open to retail investors, this market serves as
a good laboratory to study whether existing market mechanisms based on implicit and explicit
contracting are sufficient to safeguard investors’ rights.
In general, several factors make it difficult to perform a systematic study of the nature and
determinants of asset misrepresentation. For instance, most studies of corporate fraud define
fraud as events in which the rights of the shareholders of a firm are violated by its managers.
However, such violations of investors’ rights involve firms with varied production technologies
and in different time periods, making such comparisons difficult. Moreover, most of these
studies focus only on the cases where fraudulent behavior was ex-post discovered. We focus on
the RMBS market and study the disclosure activity related to sale of assets by intermediaries,
which circumvents some of these challenges. Since residential mortgages are fairly standardized
and have a simple structure, comparisons of disclosure activity are relatively easier. In addition,
detailed histories of such activity by financial institutions involved in sale of RMBS are available,
allowing us to study asset misrepresentation by these firms over time as well as in the crosssection. Finally, our methodology will identify asset misrepresentation regardless of whether or
not it is ex-post discovered by the investors.
We start our analysis by combining two sources of data, loan-level data on mortgages from
BlackBox with data on consumer credit files from Equifax, to construct two measures of
misrepresentation regarding the quality of mortgages backing the RMBS pools. The mortgagelevel data include characteristics of loans that were disclosed to the investors at the time of asset
sale. The consumer credit data, which were not available to investors at the asset sale date,
contains the actual characteristics of loans at the same time. The matching between the two
datasets is done by the credit bureau.
Using the combined dataset we identify two, relatively easy-to-quantify, dimensions of asset
quality misrepresentation by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages. The first
misrepresentation concerns loans that are reported as being collateralized by owner-occupied
properties when in fact these properties were owned by borrowers with a different primary
residence (e.g., a property acquired as an investment or as a second home). The second form of
misrepresentation concerns loans that are reported as having no other lien when in fact the
properties backing the first (senior) mortgage were also financed with a simultaneously
originated closed-end second (junior) mortgage. The advantage of looking at this second type of
misrepresentation is that it clearly indicates that the distortion of information occurred within the
boundaries of the financial industry, as some institutions (e.g., a lender financing a second lien
loan) had to be aware of the presence of such higher liens. Our hope in both instances is to
directly identify asset misrepresentations relative to sellers’ contractual disclosure. This
differentiates our study from the literature that infers the decisions of agents in the supply chain
2

of credit (e.g., screening by lenders) based on outcome variables such as delinquencies (e.g.,
Keys et al. 2010).
A high-quality match between the dataset that contains actual loan characteristics and that
containing characteristics reported to investors is critical for constructing measures of
misrepresentation. We conduct extensive analysis that suggests that the misrepresentations we
identify are not likely to be an artifact of matching error between the datasets that were merged
by the credit bureau. In particular, we follow a conservative approach and conduct our analysis
only on loans that were matched across the datasets with highest confidence level by the credit
bureau. We confirm the high quality of this merge when we conduct an independent analysis of
various data fields and find that, for the vast majority of cases, these fields are the same across
the two databases. More importantly, as we will demonstrate, the misrepresented loans we
identify strongly predict ex post delinquencies, further confirming our assertion that these loans
misreport meaningful information about asset quality. This is not the pattern we find for a
placebo test where we use few incidences of likely data errors across datasets to construct a
measure of pseudo misrepresentation. 3 Finally, we cross-validate the merge quality using an
internal database from a large subprime lender. We find that almost all loans we identified as
having second liens that are not disclosed to investors do indeed have such liens reported in the
bank's internal data.
Using our measures we find a significant degree of misrepresentation of collateral quality across
non-agency RMBS pools. More than 6% of mortgage loans reported for owner-occupied
properties were given to borrowers with a different primary residence, while more than 7% of
loans (13.6% of loans using a broader definition) stating that a junior lien is not present actually
had such a second lien. Alternatively put, more than 27% of loans obtained by non-owner
occupants misreported their true purpose and more than 15% of loans with closed-end second
liens incorrectly reported no presence of such liens. The propensity of banks to sell loans that
misrepresented asset quality increased as the housing market boomed, peaking in 2006. Overall,
more than 9% of loans had one of these misrepresentations in our data. Note, however, that
because we look only at two types of misrepresentations, this number likely constitutes a
conservative, lower-bound estimate of the fraction of misrepresented loans.
We find that these misrepresentations have significant economic consequences. In particular,
loans with misrepresented borrower occupancy status have about a 9.4% higher likelihood of
default (90 days past due on payments during the first two years since origination), compared
3 The placebo test uses the notion that incorrectly merged records should not have such a strong relationship with
the subsequent adverse performance of loans. In particular, we focused on the few records in our database for which
the loan balance of the first mortgage does not exactly match across the two databases. We find that the subsequent
performance of such loans in terms of their default risk is similar to that of loans with perfectly matching balances
across the two databases (see Appendix A for more details).
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with loans with similar characteristics and where the property was truthfully reported as being
the primary residence of the borrower. This implies a more than 60% higher default rate relative
to the mean default rate of owner-occupants during our sample period. Similarly, loans with a
misrepresented higher lien -- which we find are likely to be fully documented loans -- have about
a 10.1% higher likelihood of default compared with loans with similar characteristics and no
higher lien. This is again a large increase, about 70%, relative to the mean default rate of loans
without higher liens. Thus, our results indicate the same pattern for the two measures, which
confirms that the misrepresentations we identified capture economically meaningful information
about asset quality. Because of their substantially worse performance, misrepresented loans
account for more than 15% of mortgages that defaulted in our sample, a higher share than their
proportion in the overall sample (about 10%).
Next, we investigate if misrepresentations on the two dimensions, given that they are associated
with higher mortgage defaults, appear to be priced in by lenders and investors. To do this we first
assess whether lenders charged higher interest rates for loans with misrepresented quality. We
find that mortgages with misrepresented owner occupancy status are charged interest rates that
are higher when compared with loans with similar characteristics and where the property was
truthfully reported as being the primary residence of the borrower. Similarly, interest rates on
loans with misrepresented second liens are generally somewhat higher when compared with
loans with similar characteristics and no second lien. Given the increased defaults of these
misrepresented loans, this suggests that lenders were partly aware of the higher risk of these
loans. Strikingly, however, we find that the interest rate markups on the misrepresented loans are
much smaller relative to loans where the property was truthfully disclosed as not being primary
residence of the borrower and as having a higher lien. This suggests that relative to prevailing
interest pricing of that time, interest rates on misrepresented mortgages did not fully reflect their
higher default risk.
We also examine whether pools with a higher incidence of misrepresented assets were perceived
to be of lower quality by investors. For that purpose, we investigate the relation between
misreporting in a pool and the measures of pricing used in the literature, i.e., imputed average
yield of the pool as well as the subordination level that protects its AAA-rated tranches.4 Using
these measures, we find little evidence that investors were compensated for a greater risk of
securities involving a higher share of misreported assets. These results suggest that RMBS
investors had to bear a higher risk than they might have perceived based on the contractual
disclosure. As a result, investors could argue that the ex ante value of the securities with
misrepresented assets that were sold to them was less than the price paid, and truthful disclosure
4

As is the case in the literature we do not have access to data on actual prices paid by the investors at the time of
pool issuance (see Keys et al. 2012). Instead, consistent with literature as well as industry practice, we use proxies of
prices such as average balance-weighted coupon for the (see Section VI for more details). The proxies we use are
the same as those used by prior work to investigate whether risk of collateral was reflected in investor prices (e.g.,
Faltin-Traeger, Johnson, and Mayer 2010; Demiroglu and James, forthcoming; He, Qian, and Strahan, forthcoming).
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of the characteristics of the assets could have prevented some of their losses. Assuming that our
estimates are broadly applicable to the entire stock of outstanding non-agency securitized loans
just prior to the crisis, enforcement of contractual guarantees by investors in response to these
misrepresentations could result in forced repurchases of mortgages with combined balance of up
to $160 billion.5
We also investigate the variation in asset misrepresentation across underwriters. We demonstrate
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the extent of these misrepresentations across
underwriters. The propensity to misrepresent is largely unrelated to measures of incentives for
top management and to quality of risk management inside these firms. While misrepresentations
appear to be less prevalent among commercial banks, underwriters with more RMBS experience,
and underwriters with more high-powered incentives given to its top management and better
internal management, none of these associations is statistically significant. Importantly, a
significant degree of misrepresentation exists across all reputable intermediaries in our sample.
Finally, we also find no relation between share of misrepresented loans and leniency of
regulatory environment in a region.
Our earlier analysis suggests that lenders were partly aware of the risk of misrepresented loans
since it was reflected in the interest rates charged on these loans. In the last part of the paper we
examine where in the supply chain of credit--i.e., at the borrower, lender, or underwriter level-these misrepresentations likely took place. This analysis requires significantly richer micro data
than are available to us, but we are able to provide some evidence that suggests that part of the
misrepresentation occurs at the level of the financial institution. In particular, we use an internal
database of a large subprime lender in which we observe the data that were available to the
lender as well as data that were disclosed to the investors. To the extent that practices in this
subprime lender are representative, our findings suggest that misrepresentation concerning
owner-occupancy status was made early in the origination process, possibly by the borrower or
broker originating a loan on behalf of the lending institution. In contrast, the lender was aware of
the presence of second liens, and hence their misreporting likely occurs later in the supply
chain.6 This last result is also consistent with our earlier evidence that loans misrepresented on
the dimension of higher liens are more likely to be fully documented.
Our findings contribute to the debate on the recent crisis. We provide evidence showing that
investors bought assets that not only proved to be ex post risky but may also have been, at least
in part, ex ante misrepresented by financial intermediaries. More broadly, our results suggest that
the current market arrangements -- based on reputational concerns and explicit incentives -- may
5

We note that asset misrepresentations by intermediaries could induce other costs beyond those directly incurred by
the investors. For instance, these misrepresentations could have also led to misallocation of scarce investor capital
among the proposed real investment projects in the economy.
6
Our review of mortgage deeds records from the FirstAmerican database indicates that both first-lien and closely
situated second-lien mortgages on a given property were commonly financed by the same lending institution.
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have been insufficient to prevent and eliminate widespread misrepresentations of asset quality in
a large capital market. These findings suggest that a critical inspection of the protection of
investors in other capital markets, especially those with more passive investors like the highgrade investment debt market, may be warranted. Our findings resonate well with studies that
suggest that the existing regulatory framework may have also been insufficient in preventing
such behavior by various actors in the supply chain of credit (see Keys et al. 2009; Keys et al.
forthcoming, and Agarwal et al. 2012).
Our work relates to the recent empirical literature on the housing crisis (e.g., Mian and Sufi 2009,
forthcoming; Mayer et al. 2009; Campbell et al., forthcoming; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig
2010; Keys, Seru, and Vig, forthcoming; Rajan, Seru, and Vig, forthcoming; Piskorski, Seru, and
Vig 2010; Melzer 2010; Mian and Sufi 2011; Agarwal et al. 2011; Demyanyk and Van Hemert
2011; Purnanandam, forthcoming). In this literature, our research on the extent and consequences
of loan misrepresentation in the mortgage securitization market is closest to studies that attempt
to infer decisions of borrowers and financial institutions (e.g., lenders) using data based on
outcome variables such as delinquencies (see Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), BenDavid (2011)). It is also related to Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2012) that provides evidence of
misrepresentation of borrower income, and Garmaise (2012) that provides evidence that suggests
that borrowers overstated their assets and that loans granted to such borrowers had higher default
rates. In contrast to these papers, we attempt to directly identify misrepresentation of asset
quality.
Our analysis is also closely related to recent research by Haughwout et al. (2011) who employ
credit bureau data to identify properties acquired by real estate investors. Like our paper,
Haughwout et al. also identify some proportion of such buyers as misreporting their intentions to
occupy a property. Their focus is on explaining the role such buyers played in the recent boom
and bust in the housing market.7 In contrast, our focus is on identifying the consequences of such
misrepresentations on additional defaults and on understanding whether these misrepresentations
were priced by investors and lenders as well as which underwriter characteristics relate to such
behavior.
Finally, our work is also related to a large literature in accounting and finance that investigates
various aspects of corporate fraud (e.g., Richardson et al. 2002; Burns and Kedia 2006; Kedia
and Philippon 2009; Efendi et al. 2007; Dyck et al., forthcoming). It is also connected to the
work in law and economics that focuses on securities fraud litigation (e.g., Choi et al., 2009
Griffin et al. 2001). We contribute to this area by providing systematic evidence on the
characteristics of asset misrepresentation -- in the cross-section of financial intermediaries and
across time -- in a large debt market.
7

See also related research by Chinco and Mayer (2012) who use deeds records to identify distant real estate
investors and study their role in fueling the recent boom in house prices.
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Section II: Information Disclosure on Collateral Quality of RMBS
The vast majority of mortgages originated in the United States are not held by the banks that
originated them but are instead securitized and sold as securities to investors. In this paper we
focus on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that are collateralized by mortgage
loans that are originated without government guarantees (non-agency RMBS). This sector was a
significant portion of the overall mortgage market and reached more than $2 trillion of securities
outstanding (Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, forthcoming).
In our analysis we are concerned about the misrepresentation of collateral backing RMBS. When
a pool of mortgages is sold to investors, the underlying characteristics and quality of these
mortgages are disclosed in the prospectus of the pool in the section related to “representations
and warranties.” This disclosure usually contains information about risk-relevant variables, such
as loan-to-value ratios of loans in the pool, their interest rates, borrowers’ credit scores, and the
occupancy status and location of the properties backing the mortgages in the pool. Our analysis
focuses on two misrepresentations that our data enable us to identify. The first misrepresentation
concerns the occupancy status of the property backing the loan because, as we explain later, such
status can impact how much risk is associated with the mortgage. In particular, we are interested
in identifying loans reported as being collateralized by owner-occupied properties when in fact
these properties were owned by borrowers with a different primary residence (e.g., a property
acquired as an investment or as a second home). We now provide an example of a contractual
disclosure that refers to asset quality on this dimension -- namely, the prospectus supplement for
Series 2006-FF15 states:
The prospectus supplement will disclose the aggregate principal balance of Mortgage
Loans secured by Mortgaged Properties that are owner-occupied.8
The second case of asset-quality misreporting we consider concerns loans that are reported as
having no associated higher liens when in fact the properties backing the first (senior) mortgage
were also financed with a simultaneously originated second (junior) mortgage. Prospectus
supplements commonly make statements regarding the total value of all liens on the
collateralized property. As we explain, omitting information on the junior mortgages on a
property will also understate the true risk associated with the pool collateral. Again, it is useful to
provide an example of such contractual disclosure. The prospectus supplement of WFMBS
Series 2007-7 states:
For purposes of Appendix A, the “Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio” or “CLTV” is the
ratio, expressed as a percentage, of (i) the principal amount of the Mortgage Loan at
origination plus (a) any junior mortgage encumbering the related Mortgaged Property
8

The prospectus supplements will also usually describe the frequency of loans for second homes or investor
properties. For example, the prospectus supplement for the Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities Series 2007–8
states, “Approximately 0.02% (by aggregate unpaid principal balance as of the cut-off date) of the mortgage loans in
the mortgage pool are expected to be secured by investor properties.”
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originated by the Sponsor or of which the Sponsor has knowledge at the time of the
origination of the Mortgage Loan or (b) the total available amount of any home equity
line of credit originated by the Sponsor or of which the Sponsor has knowledge at the
time of the origination of the Mortgage Loan, over (ii) the lesser of (a) the appraised
value of the related Mortgaged Property at origination or (b) the sales price for such
property.9
As we explain in detail in Section IV, in order to identify such a misrepresentation we use loanlevel data concerning the characteristics of mortgages in the pool that were disclosed to the
investors at the time when the pool was sold. This data contains the most detailed information
that is contractually provided to investors by asset sellers and pertains to the quality of loans that
back the mortgaged-backed securities. Then, using another proprietary matched dataset that
contains information on the actual characteristics of these loans, we verify whether the
information disclosed to the investors was accurate. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that our
analysis is from the perspective of an investor who used detailed loan level information available
from the trustee at the time of sale of the pool. We discuss how this assumption could impact our
inferences in Section VIII.
The information contractually disclosed to investors allows them to assess the risk of the security.
Previous research has shown that mortgages with a higher loan amount relative to property value
and loans backed by non-owner-occupied properties are often associated with greater default risk
(see Mayer et al. 2009). Thus, both of these misrepresentations could imply that RMBS investors
had to bear a higher risk than they might have perceived based on the contractual disclosure. As
a result, investors could argue that the ex ante value of the securities with misrepresented
collateral that was sold to them was less than the price paid, and full disclosure of the true
characteristics of the collateral could have prevented their loss.
Misrepresentation can also have consequences for the party securitizing the mortgages (i.e., the
intermediary who does the underwriting of the pool) since such parties are often contractually
liable to guarantee that the underlying collateral in a pool is accurately represented. Of particular
relevance are contractual obligations that force the lender or underwriter to repurchase the loan
from the securitization trust. For instance, the prospectus supplement for Series OOMC 2005HE6 of Asset Backed Pass-through Certificates states:

9

Similarly, the prospectus supplement for First Franklin’s Series 2006-FF15 reports that “original full Combined
Loan-to-Value Ratio reflects the original Loan-to-Value Ratio, including any subordinate liens, whether or not such
subordinate liens are owned by the Trust Fund."
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If the seller or the originator fails to cure a material breach of its representations and
warranties with respect to any mortgage loan in a timely manner, then the seller or the
originator would be required to repurchase or substitute the defective mortgage loan.10
It is worth noting that though such repurchase clauses were common in the market during 2005
and 2006, actual enforcement of these contracts was not as strict (see Piskorski et al. 2010).
However, the enforcement of these contractual agreements has become more important since the
crisis and has been the center of many recent lawsuits filed by investors.
Section III: Data
Our primary dataset links two databases that allow us to construct our measures of asset
collateral misrepresentation: (i) loan-level mortgage data collected by BlackBox Logic and (ii)
borrower-level credit report information collected by Equifax.
BlackBox is a private company that provides a comprehensive, dynamic dataset with information
about twenty-one million privately securitized Subprime, Alt-A, and Prime loans originated after
1999. These loans account for about 90% of all privately securitized mortgages from that period.
The BlackBox data, which are obtained from mortgage servicers and securitization trustees,
include static information taken at the time of origination, such as the mortgage date and amount,
borrower FICO credit score,11 servicer name, interest rate, term, interest rate type, CLTV, and
borrower occupancy status. The BlackBox data also include dynamic data on monthly payments,
mortgage balances, and delinquency status. Importantly, this database collects information from
trustees of mortgage pools and contains information concerning characteristics of mortgages in
the pool that were disclosed to the investors at the time when the pool was sold.
The other dataset that we use is from Equifax -- a credit reporting agency that provides monthly
data on borrowers’ actual current credit scores, payments and balances on mortgage and
installment debt, and balances and credit utilization for revolving debt (such as credit cards and
home-equity lines of credit [HELOCs]). Equifax has recently linked their credit information data
to the BlackBox data using a proprietary match algorithm that merges on more than twenty-five
variables (see Appendix A for more details on our data). Consequently, we use the information
from Equifax to verify whether information disclosed to the investors -- captured through the
BlackBox sample -- was misrepresented.
10

Similarly, the prospectus supplement for Series 2006-FF15 of the First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust states:
"Following the discovery of a breach of any representation or warranty that materially and adversely affects the
value of a mortgage loan, or receipt of notice of that breach, the mortgage loan seller or the sponsor will be required
to either (1) cure that breach, (2) repurchase the affected mortgage loan from the trust fund or (3) in certain
circumstances, substitute another mortgage loan."
11
The FICO is the most widely known type of consumer credit score, developed by FICO, previously known as Fair
Isaac Corporation. The FICO scores range from 350 to 850, with a higher score indicating a more creditworthy
borrower. See Keys et al. (2010) for more discussion.
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Overall, we impose three restrictions on the merged BlackBox-Equifax data. First, we limit our
dataset to loans originated from 2005 to 2007, years for which we have full Equifax data. Second,
we retain only first liens, identified as loans with the following characteristics in the BlackBox
dataset: either (i) a lien type of “first” or (ii) if the lien type is “unknown,” an origination LTV of
at least fifty-five. The second restriction allows us to include loans of unknown lien type in our
sample that are not likely to be subordinate liens. Third, we restrict the sample to include only
loans that have the highest Equifax merge-confidence level (Equifax reports a merge-confidence
level that ranges from low to high confidence). As we discuss in the next section this step is
important because without Equifax data correctly matched with BlackBox data, we would not be
able to plausibly construct our misrepresentation measures. After imposing these restrictions, we
obtain a base sample that includes approximately 1.9 million loans. As we show in the Appendix
A, imposing these restrictions leads to a sample with slightly higher-quality observables than in
the overall data.
Section IV: Constructing Measures of Loan Misrepresentation
We construct two measures of asset-quality misrepresentation in RMBS pools, the first of which
examines whether a given loan reports the occupancy status of the borrower correctly. In
particular, we are interested in examining whether the borrower is reported as being an owneroccupant when in fact the property is not the borrower’s primary residence. To construct this
measure, we start with our base sample and restrict the sample to include only loans that are
reported as owner-occupied in the BlackBox dataset at the time of origination. This gives us a
sample of 1,563,223 loans.
Our measure of owner-occupancy misrepresentation is constructed by taking advantage of the
mailing address zip code reported to Equifax. The zip code reported to a credit bureau such as
Equifax should generally match the property address zip code reported to the trustee of the
RMBS for owner-occupied homes (available in the BlackBox dataset). To allow for reporting
delays, we follow a very conservative approach and compare the Equifax zip code reported each
month over the first year of the loan’s life to the property zip code reported to BlackBox at
origination. If none of these twelve Equifax zip codes match with the BlackBox dataset, we
classify this loan’s borrower as a misreported non-owner-occupant.
The second measure of asset-quality misrepresentation concerns identifying whether loans that
were reported to RMBS investors as having no associated second lien at the time of sale of the
pool did in fact have a second lien. Among other characteristics, the loan-level information
disclosed to investors at the time of purchase consists of the combined loan-to-value (CLTV)
ratio for all liens on the property at the time of loan origination. If the lender was unable to
ascertain this value or was not willing to disclose this information, the loan is usually given a
10

missing CLTV. While it is possible that some of these loans with missing CLTV values were set
to be missing due to asset misrepresentation, it is hard to know this with certainty. Therefore, we
again take a conservative approach and do not consider these loans to have been misrepresented
on this dimension. Instead, we identify loans with no explicitly reported second liens by
restricting our sample to loans with non-missing values of CLTV, where the reported CLTV is
within 1% of the loan’s LTV. 12 For these loans we are confident that the securitized first
mortgage (senior loan) was reported to the trustee of RMBS as having only one lien on the
property. This yields a sample of 854,959 loans that report no presence of second liens.
We construct our second measure of asset misrepresentation based on the observation that the
credit bureau data (Equifax) includes information about other mortgages held by each borrower.
We can therefore examine whether loans that are reported to RMBS investors as having no
simultaneous second liens do in fact have a second lien reported in the credit bureau data.13 As in
the case of our first measure, because we focus on data with the highest merge quality, we are
confident that such instances do in fact reveal second liens that were misreported to RMBS
investors.
We must make a judgment call in identifying second liens as either simultaneously or
subsequently originated. In this paper, we classify simultaneous second liens as those that appear
in the credit bureau data with an origination date within 45 days of that of the first lien. We
classify a loan as having a misreported second lien if the loan is reported to investors as having
no second lien but does show presence of such a lien in the credit bureau data within this time
window. The 45-day window we use allows for reporting delays or potentially imputed
origination dates in the Blackbox data. It is also quite unlikely that a borrower would obtain a
subsequent second lien on a mortgage within this time period without the lender of the first lien
having that information when reporting to the trustees. Regardless, we have experimented with
this window and the results reported later are not sensitive to changes in the length of this
window.
IV.A Verifying Quality of Misrepresentation Measures

12

We have also verified that loans reported to investors as having second liens do indeed have such mortgages
reported in the credit bureau data. In fact about 90% of loans that report CLTV greater than LTV has junior loan
present in the Equifax database. The remainder likely represents the cases where lenders have not promptly reported
their records to the credit bureau data, which we confirmed with the data vendor. Note that if anything it makes our
measure of misrepresentation a conservative estimate since we may not be able to detect some misreported second
liens.
13
We take a conservative approach and throughout most of our analysis we do not consider loans as being
misrepresented if reported CLTV by the trustee does not include HELOC balance in its calculation. Despite the fact
that prospectuses often include such loans in definition of CLTV (see example in Section II), one could argue that
such loans are harder to categorize as being misrepresented mortgage and instead could be perceived as revolving
debt similar to credit card debt. The level of misrepresentation is much higher if we consider HELOCs as second
liens (see Section V.A) and our other results are robust to such extension of our misrepresentation measure.
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We need to discuss two issues related to the quality of misrepresentation measures that we have
constructed. First, both measures rely on Equifax data being correctly matched with BlackBox
data in order to plausibly construct our misrepresentation measures. Thus, we need to ensure that
the match between these two datasets, done by the credit bureau, is of high quality. Second, even
if the match between the two databases is perfect, only our second measure (misreported second
lien) allows us to directly identify asset misrepresentation. For the first measure, which is based
on occupancy status, the misrepresentation is inferred. The reason is that we do not observe
occupancy status in the Equifax database. Instead, we infer whether or not a property is owneroccupied based on the match between the mailing zip code reported in the credit bureau data and
the property zip code reported to the trustee of the RMBS. Thus, we need to verify that the
measure based on occupancy status is not mainly reflecting errors made in this inference.
To address the first issue, we restrict our sample to those loans that have the highest mergeconfidence level assigned by the credit bureau. We then conduct an independent analysis of the
merge quality of this data, checking fields such as dynamic payment history, origination balances,
and origination dates. Regardless of whether or not the loans are misrepresented based on our
measures, the vast majority of other fields are the same across the two databases (see Data
Appendix for more details).14
Next, we note that available evidence indicates that loans backed by non-owner-occupied
properties and loans with second lines have higher delinquency rates (see Mayer et al. 2009).
Hence, if our measures correctly identify the two misrepresentations, we would expect such
loans to have a higher default pattern compared with loans that are not misrepresented. In fact, as
we show in Section V.C, we find that ex post delinquencies of such loans are more than 60%
higher when compared with otherwise similar loans. It is worth noting here that we also
conducted a placebo test using the notion that incorrectly merged records should not have such a
strong relationship with the subsequent adverse performance of loans. In particular, as discussed
in Appendix A, we focused on the few records in our database for which the loan balance of the
first mortgage does not exactly match across the two databases. The balance of the securitized
first mortgage is unlikely to be misreported to investors because servicers verify and report on a
monthly basis the outstanding loan amount and payments to the securitization trust; hence, such
records may indicate incorrectly merged loans across the two databases. We find that
subsequent performance of such loans in terms of their default risk is similar in economic terms
to loans with a perfectly matching balance across the two databases. This evidence provides
further support that our methodology allows us to identify actual misrepresentation of asset
quality instead of reflecting few incorrectly merged records.
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For example, for the entire sample, the match between payment histories increase monotonically with Equifax’s
confidence measure, with only 0.3% of the highest confidence loans having different BlackBox and Equifax
payment statuses.
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Next, recall that if our sample consists of correctly merged records, we can directly identify
whether or not a given loan has an undisclosed second lien. As we discuss in Section VII, we are
able to cross-validate the merge quality using an internal database from a large subprime lender
in which almost all loans identified by us as having misreported junior liens do indeed have such
liens reported in the bank's internal data.15
Finally, turning to the second issue, we verify that our method of inferring whether or not a
property is owner-occupied is reasonable. In particular, we find that our method of inference
matches well with the status reported to the trustee of the RMBS. Among loans reported as being
for non-owner-occupied properties, the majority (about two-thirds) have a mailing address zip
code of the borrower in the Equifax database that does not match with the property address in the
BlackBox database.16 Similarly, a majority (about 70%) of reported owner-occupants residing in
the same zip code have only one first mortgage on the credit file from Equifax. Moreover, our
measure of owner-occupancy misreporting also correlates strongly with borrowers that acquired
multiple properties and hence are likely to be real estate investors. In particular, a majority (more
than 60%) of reported owner-occupants whose property zip code does not match with their credit
file zip code do have multiple first mortgages on their credit file, indicating that they acquired
multiple properties.17
Section V: Empirical Facts on Misrepresentation
In Section V.A, we present descriptive statistics. Section V.B and Section V.C present the
empirical results related to the two measures of asset misrepresentation.
V. A Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 displays summary statistics for loans reported as for owner-occupied
properties. As we observe, 6.43% of mortgages reported as for owner-occupied properties are
misrepresented based on our method. In other words, these records have a mailing address zip
code of the borrower in the Equifax database that does not match with the property address in the
BlackBox database, suggesting that the borrower was not a primary resident of these properties.
15

We find that more than 93% of such loans have second liens recorded in the bank’s internal database. This
exercise confirms the quality of merged data we use and shows that almost all loans identified by us as being
misrepresented on the dimension of second lien are correctly assigned into this category. The remainder, less than
7%, of loans that do not have a second lien recorded in the New Century database are not necessarily incorrect
merges because they may simply represent the cases where New Century was not aware of the simultaneous secondlien mortgage originated by another lending institution.
16 This indicates that about a third of properties whose owner-occupancy status is reported to a trustee of the RMBS
as being investor-owned have owners residing in the same zip code as the property. This likely reflects the fact that a
non-negligible fraction of investors purchase properties in their zip code of residence – a fact we corroborated to be
potentially true based on our conversations with several industry practitioners.
17 This is also true for collateral with reported non-owner-occupants. In particular, more than 80% of such borrowers
have multiple first mortgages, based on the credit file.
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Alternatively put, more than 27% of loans obtained by non-owner occupants misreported their
true purpose.
Panel B of Table 1 reports similar statistics for loans that report no presence of second liens to
RMBS investors (e.g., CLTV and LTV ratios are the same in the BlackBox data). As we observe,
we find that about 7.1% of mortgages in this sample are misrepresented as these loans do have
associated second liens in the credit bureau data. This implies that more than 15% of loans with
closed-end second liens in our sample incorrectly reported that such loans were not present. It is
worth noting that if we treat HELOCs as second liens, the overall level of misreported second
liens is almost twice as large. In particular, 13.6% of loans that report that second lien is not
present do actually have closed-end second mortgage or a HELOC with positive outstanding
balance originated at the same time as a senior mortgage.
One could contemplate that possibility of asset misrepresentation and more broadly a lower
quality of the reported data may have been indicated to the investors through low or no
documentation status of loans. However, as Table 1 shows, we find significant extent of
misrepresentation even when we focus on fully documented loans. About 4.7% of fully
documented loans reported as for owner-occupied properties were given to borrowers with a
different primary residence, while about 7.9% of fully documented loans stating that a junior lien
is not present actually had such a second lien. Interestingly, while the extent of misrepresentation
of owner-occupancy status is somewhat lower for fully documented loans, it is actually higher
for misrepresentation of second-lien.
Overall, our measures imply that about 9.1% of loans have either misrepresentation (i.e.,
misreported owner-occupancy status or misreported second lien). This number would be about
12.2% were we to include HELOCs when inferring misreported second liens.
In Figures 1A and 1B, we display the geographical concentration of loan misrepresentations.
Figure 1A presents the fraction of loans with misrepresented owner-occupancy status across the
United States in our data. As can be observed from this figure, misrepresentations of owneroccupancy status are most pronounced in coastal and West Coast markets such as Florida,
California, Arizona, and Nevada (with more than 7% of loans being misreported, according to
our measure), which were booming real estate markets leading up to the crisis. This is consistent
with the significant activity of non-owner-occupant borrowers documented in these regional
markets prior to the recent housing crisis (see Chinco and Mayer 2012). Our measure indicates
that a significant portion of the purchases made by non-owner-occupants in these regions was
financed with mortgages that misrepresented their true purpose. For example, in our data about
22.5% of loans in Florida were reported to be non-owner-occupant loans. At the same time,
according to our measure, about 9.5% of mortgaged properties in Florida that were reported as
owner-occupied were actually non-owner-occupied properties. This implies that about a third of
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loans obtained by non-owner occupants in Florida misreported their true purpose. In contrast,
Figure 1A shows that rural states such as Nebraska and South Dakota have some of the lowest
fractions of loans that misrepresent the owner-occupancy status (2.5% and 2.8%, respectively).
This lower incidence of misrepresentation is most likely tied to the less pronounced presence of
non-owner-occupant borrowers in these regional markets.
Figure 1B presents the corresponding results for the fraction of loans that our measure indicates
were financed with misrepresented second liens. We note that the geographical distribution of
this misrepresentation is somewhat different from the owner-occupancy status results displayed
in Figure 1A. In particular, West Coast states and coastal states that have a pronounced presence
of owner-occupancy misreporting show a relatively lower incidence of misreported second liens.
In contrast, states such as Texas and some of the Midwestern states show a more pronounced
incidence of misreported second liens (more than 12% of loans erroneously report the absence of
a second lien based on our measure).
To investigate this further, we examine how the extent of misrepresentations across MSAs
(Metropolitan Statistical Areas) covaries with house price movement and volume of loan
origination. Specifically, we regress the mean value of given misrepresentation at the MSA level
against annualized HPI growth from 2001 to 2004 at the MSA level, annualized HPI growth
from 2005 to 2006 at the MSA level, and a variable accounting for the MSA loan volume. This
last variable, Share of 2005–2007 Loan Originations, is defined as the number of loans
originated in the MSA from 2005 to 2007 divided by the total number of loans originated over
this time period, using the overall BlackBox loan sample. Table 2 reports the results.
Consistent with our findings in Figure 1A, we observe in Column (1) of Table 2 that
misrepresentations regarding owner-occupancy status were most prevalent in regions with large
pre-crisis HPI growth, which typifies states such as Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada.
Similarly, the misreported second lien results in Column (2) corroborate our state-level findings
from Figure 1B, as these misrepresentations are prevalent in regions that experienced less home
price appreciation, such as Texas and the Midwestern states. Both misrepresentations are
correlated with larger loan volumes, suggesting a connection between increased lending activity
and asset misrepresentations.
V.B Relation of Misrepresentation with Observables and Its Evolution over Time
In this section we investigate the degree to which asset misrepresentation varies with observables
and over time. We begin by estimating three loan-level regressions that allow us to assess the
relationship between asset misrepresentation and other observables.
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In these specifications the dependent variable is a dummy variable, Misreported Non-OwnerOccupant, that takes a value of 1 if the owner-occupancy status of the loan is misrepresented to
be owner-occupied when it is truly non-owner-occupied as identified by our method, and is 0
otherwise. Because we are interested in assessing how asset misrepresentation is related to the
observable characteristics of loans, we include a rich vector of loan-level observable
characteristics, such as origination interest rate, credit score, and LTV ratio.
We present the results in Table 3. Column (1) of Panel A presents the results of these regressions
with basic controls.18 The second column adds a control for variation in merge confidence. This
accounts for heterogeneity in the confidence with which we are able to infer whether or not there
was asset misrepresentation using our method. Finally, the third column also includes half-year
fixed effects capturing the loan origination date. This allows us to track the evolution of asset
misrepresentation over time.
As is evident, all coefficients reported on observables are stable across these three specifications
and are statistically significant. These results suggest that loans with asset misrepresentation on
owner-occupancy status, as identified by our method, are more likely to have higher loan interest
rates and CLTV ratios. Moreover, these loans often tend to be of an option adjustable-rate
mortgage (ARM)19 type and have low or no additional documentation provided. We note that the
relation between observables and asset misrepresentation also seems economically meaningful.
For instance, the probability of asset misrepresentation based on the owner-occupancy status of a
loan increases by more than 7% (more than 100% relative to the mean) if the loan contract is an
option ARM. Likewise, the low-documentation status is associated with a nearly 3% increase in
the probability of asset misrepresentation. Broadly, the features that are positively related to asset
misrepresentation on the dimension of occupancy status are typically associated with purchase
mortgages of the Alt-A type of credit risk.20
Although the addition of origination cohort controls does not seriously impact the sign or
significance of the regression coefficients, the fixed effects themselves illustrate an interesting
trend. In Column (1) of Table 4, we report these coefficients relative to the mean asset
misrepresentation in 2005 (the omitted category in these regressions). As is evident, loans with
asset misrepresentation regarding their owner-occupancy status became more prevalent in the
run-up to the crisis. Note that we start in 2005 because we do not have reliable data prior to this
18

Throughout the paper we estimate our specifications using the OLS despite the binary nature of several of the
dependent variables. Our OLS specification with flexible controls to capture nonlinearity allows us to estimate our
coefficients consistently even with multiple fixed effects (Dinardo and Johnston 1996).
19
Unlike more traditional fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) or adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), an option ARM is an
adjustable rate mortgage that lets borrowers pay only the interest portion of the debt or even less than that, while the
loan balance can grow above the amount initially borrowed up to a certain limit. See Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010),
Amromin et al. (2011), and Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (forthcoming) for more discussion of these contracts.
20 The Alt-A risk category consist of loans that, for various reasons (e.g., low documentation), are considered riskier
by loan originators than prime loans but less risky than subprime mortgages.
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period. The average propensity of asset misrepresentation peaks in the first half of 2007 and then
drops sharply thereafter. This could reflect the fact that, with the contraction of the non-agency
securitization market, scrutiny in the private market was elevated around this time period and
credit standards tightened.
We now follow the same empirical approach and use our second measure of asset
misrepresentation, which identifies loans that state that only a single lien is present while in fact
there is an associated second junior lien. Specifically, the dependent variable in these regressions
is a dummy, Misreported Second, that takes a value of 1 if the loan states that it has no
simultaneous second lien but our method infers that there is one, and is 0 otherwise. The results
are displayed in Panel B of Table 3. The specifications follow the same order as Panel A.
The results indicate that loans that are classified as having misrepresented asset quality on the
dimension of second liens tend to have lower interest rates, smaller origination balances, and
lower CLTV ratios. In contrast to what we found in Panel A, the coefficients are negative and
significant for low- and no-documentation loans and for option ARMs. These features broadly
depict patterns that are expected of typical loans with second liens. These findings suggest that
the lenders may have been aware of the presence of second liens -- given that they were more
likely to collect information on the assets, income, and employment of borrowers when granting
the first mortgage -- and that this information was indeed misrepresented to the investors of
RMBS. We investigate this hypothesis further in Section VIII.
Similar to the inferences in Panel A, the cohort fixed effects do not change the qualitative or
quantitative relation between asset misrepresentation and loan observables, but they again paint a
consistent picture. In particular, in Column (2) of Table 4, we again find a growing pattern of
asset misrepresentation on the dimension of misreported second liens through the boom until
about the first half of 2006. Thereafter, the prevalence decreased with time, with small negative
fixed effects beginning in the second half of 2006.
V.C Loan misrepresentation and ex post defaults
V.C.1 Mortgage Debt
Do our measures of asset misrepresentation imply that RMBS investors bought assets that were
of a higher risk than they could have estimated using the information disclosed at the time of
purchase? Evaluating this issue requires us to assess whether these asset misrepresentations did
indeed imply that the quality of these loans was worse than what the investors of the RMBS
might have perceived given the disclosed information.
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To make this assessment, we examine how the measures of asset misrepresentation are related to
subsequent defaults on mortgages, accounting for the observables that were disclosed to
investors at the time of RMBS issuance. To that end, we estimate various specifications
investigating the impact of the two types of asset misrepresentation on the mortgage’s ex post
default likelihood and report the results in Panels A and B of Table 5.
We start by examining the relation between default likelihood and asset misrepresentation based
on the owner-occupancy status of the loans. The dependent variable in these regressions is a
dummy that takes a value of 1 if the mortgage goes 90 days past due on payments during the first
two years since origination and is 0 otherwise. The right-hand variables include a dummy,
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant, to indicate whether there was asset misrepresentation on
owner-occupancy as per our method, as well as a vector of controls that account for differences
in loan characteristics at origination that were available to investors.
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results. The first column estimates this specification for the
entire sample and includes origination cohort fixed effects along with other controls. As is
evident, we find that the Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant dummy is positive and statistically
significant. This implies that, conditional on all the relevant observables that are commonly used
in the literature to predict delinquency (e.g., see Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010; Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig 2010), asset misrepresentation on the dimension of owner-occupancy positively
predicts the subsequent delinquency of the loan. This estimate is economically significant as well.
In particular, ceteris paribus, a loan with misrepresented borrower’s occupancy status have about
a 9.4% higher likelihood of default (90 days past due on payments during the first two years
since origination), compared with loans with similar characteristics and where the property was
truthfully reported as being the primary residence of the borrower. This implies more than 60%
higher default rate relative to the mean default rate of owner-occupants during our sample period.
The remaining columns of Panel A of Table 5 re-estimate the specification in Column (1) for
different origination cohorts. As before, we report the results for 2005 as a whole, rather than in
half-yearly cohorts as in the subsequent years due to our concerns about the data quality in the
earlier part of 2005. However, the qualitative nature of the results is similar to what is reported in
the table. As is evident, the positive correlation between the Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant
dummy and the delinquency of the loan is stable across time. In terms of economic magnitudes,
the effect is the smallest in 2005. However, even in 2005, the estimate suggests an increase in
absolute delinquency by 4.04% if the asset quality of a loan is misrepresented on the dimension
of owner-occupancy (a relative increase of more than 56% over the mean default rate of 7.15%).
We also find that the absolute magnitude of the coefficients on the Misreported Non-OwnerOccupant variable grows with time. This is consistent with the notion that loans originated in
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2006 and 2007 experienced larger and more immediate house price declines -- thereby increasing
the chance of default, especially for riskier loans such as misreported non-owner-occupant loans.
We repeat the same analysis using the misrepresentation of second lien status. The results are
presented in Panel B of Table 5. Similar to our findings in Panel A, we find that the coefficient
on Misreported Second is positive and significant. This suggests that, that asset-quality
misrepresentation on the dimension of second liens also strongly predicts the likelihood of a loan
becoming delinquent, even after conditioning on all the relevant observables. The economic
magnitudes are also large. In particular, loans with misrepresented higher lien have about 70%
higher likelihood of default in relative terms compared with loans with similar characteristics
and no higher lien (a 10.2% absolute increase over a mean delinquency rate of 14.6% for this
sample).
As other columns in Panel B suggest, the relation between the misrepresentation on the
dimension of second lien and the ex post delinquency of the loan is persistent and significant
across time. Moreover, as was the case with the first measure of asset quality misrepresentation,
the absolute effect of misreported second liens on subsequent default rates grows over time
through mid-2007: from about a 7% higher default rate for loans originated in 2005 to about a
16.7% higher default rate for loans originated in the first half of 2007. We do observe smaller
effects for loans originated in the second half of 2007 (about a 6.7% increase in default rates for
loans with misreported second lien), but we note that there are very few such loans in our sample.
So far, we have analyzed how the performance of loans misrepresented on the dimension of
owner-occupancy (Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant) compares with that of loans for the
properties that are indeed the primary residence of the borrowers. We now conduct analysis
where we contrast how the performance of mortgages misrepresented on the dimension of
owner-occupancy compares with loans where the occupancy status is identical but was
accurately reported to the investors.
In Panel C of Table 5, we examine whether loans made to misreported non-owner-occupants
performed differently relative to loans that truthfully reported the non-owner-occupancy status.
For this purpose, we estimate regressions where the dependent variable is the same delinquency
dummy variable used in Panel A and Panel B. There are two variables of interest in these
regressions: the previously defined Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant dummy as well as the
Reported Non-Owner-Occupant dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the loan is reported as
secured by either a second home or investor property, and is 0 otherwise. For these regressions
we expand the earlier sample of loans with reported owner-occupied status to also include loans
backed by properties that are reported as either second homes or investor properties. The
difference in the specifications results from whether we also include half-year vintage effects
(Column 2), state fixed effects (Column 3), and whether we cluster standard errors at state level
(Column 4).
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Panel C of Table 5 shows that Reported Non-Owner-Occupant has a positive and significant
coefficient in the default regression, implying an about 3.5% absolute increase in the default rate
for these loans (about 23% relative increase in default rate compared with loans with owneroccupied purpose). This result is in line with the literature that finds that loans with non-owneroccupancy status are more likely to default when controlling for other observable risk
characteristics (see Mayer et al. 2009 and Haughwout et al. 2011). The reason is that such
borrowers are likely to default more quickly on homes that are not their primary residence, for
reasons such as weaker neighborhood and social ties.
More interestingly, Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant has a positive and much larger
coefficient in the default regression, implying an approximately 9.5% absolute increase in the
default rate for these loans (about a 64% increase in the default rate relative to loans for owneroccupied properties). These results show that loans with misreported non-owner-occupancy
status of the borrower perform worse not only with respect to loans of owner-occupants but also
relative to loans of non-owner-occupants that are correctly reported as such to investors. Thus,
misrepresentation on the dimension of owner-occupancy is indicative of borrowers with
significantly lower quality unobservable characteristics even compared with truthfully reported
non-owner-occupants.
Next we conduct a similar exercise with the second measure of misrepresentation. In particular,
we examine the relationship between a loan’s delinquency and whether this loan has a truthfully
reported second lien, a misreported second lien, or no second lien. Importantly, given the nonlinearity in relation of debt and defaults, we need to control for not only the presence of a
misreported second lien but also its size. For loans with reported second lien we already know
the CLTV ratio. For an misreported second lien, we construct a new measure of CLTV by using
the original balance of the first mortgage reported to BlackBox, the second lien balance reported
to Equifax, and the original home value (as imputed from the LTV ratio). We then allow for the
differential impact of higher level of debt on defaults by constructing four dummy interaction
variables. First, we create Misreported Second X CLTV >= 100, which takes a value of 1 if the
loan has a misreported second lien and a CLTV greater than or equal to 100, and is 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we construct Misreported Second X CLTV < 100, which takes the value of 1 if the
loan has a misreported second lien and a CLTV less than 100, and is 0 otherwise. We then
construct the corresponding measures, Reported Second X CLTV >= 100 and Reported Second X
CLTV < 100, for loans with a truthfully reported second lien and CLTV greater and less than 100,
respectively.
We now repeat the analysis of Panel B with these four interaction terms as our variables of
interest. Panel D of Table 5 reports our results. We observe that senior mortgages with second
liens are much more likely to default than those without such liens, and the effect is nearly twice
as large when the CLTV ratio is greater than or equal to 100. Moreover, unlike in the case of
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misrepresentation of owner-occupancy status, we observe similar default patterns for loans with
second liens, regardless of whether or not the presence of second lien was reported to the
investors.
Finally, we also investigate how the impact of borrower occupancy status on default varies over
time. For that purpose, we use monthly data to estimate the transition probability that a given
loan goes 90 days past due on its payments in its first two years since origination using the
sample of loans from Panel C of Table 5. We include a set of fixed effects representing the first
eight quarters of a loan history, which allows us to estimate the dynamic pattern of defaults.
Other controls include the variables used in Panel C of Table 5, as well as Reported Non-OwnerOccupant and Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant interacted with quarterly time dummies. Panel
A of Figure 2 plots the resulting cumulative delinquency rates over time for properties with
different borrower occupancy status, holding all other observables at the overall sample mean.
We observe that regardless of loan age, misreported non-owner-occupants consistently default at
significantly higher levels on their mortgages than truthfully reported non-owner-occupants, who
in turn default at a higher rate than truthfully reported owner-occupants.
Next, we repeat the same analysis for the impact of junior lien status on defaults over time using
the sample of loans from Panel D of Table 5. Controls include those used in Panel D of Table 5,
as well as quarterly time dummies and Reported Second and Misreported Second interacted with
quarterly time dummies. Panel B of Figure 2 plots cumulative delinquency rate over time by
junior lien status, holding all other observables at the overall sample mean. We observe that
loans with either a misreported or a reported second lien consistently default at significantly
higher levels than loans that truthfully reported as having no junior liens. Moreover, consistent
with our prior results, loans with second liens have similar default patterns, regardless of whether
or not the presence of a second lien is correctly reported to investors.
V.C.2 Other Forms of Debt
Next, we consider whether the two identified misrepresentations are related to how the borrower
performs on other credit products. The motivation for this analysis is to assess if borrowers with
misrepresented loans differ in terms of their inherent riskiness. We hope to make this assessment
by examining the probability of default on other forms of debt.
We utilize the borrower credit card payment histories provided by Equifax and create a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the borrower becomes 60 days past due on any credit card
account in the first two years since mortgage origination. We run a series of regressions with this
measure as the dependent variable and a vector of controls that includes credit card utilization,
available credit, monthly credit card payments, unpaid credit card balance, FICO, and merge
confidence. We define credit card utilization as the borrower’s unpaid credit card balance
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divided by the total credit card limit, effectively measuring how credit-constrained a borrower is.
We require that the borrower be current on all credit card accounts in the first month that we
observe the mortgage in the data in order to make meaningful inferences.
Table 6A shows the results of three credit card default regressions that include Misreported NonOwner-Occupant and Reported Non-Owner-Occupant as dependent variables. The excluded
category represents loans for which the borrower has been truthfully reported as an owneroccupant based on our measure. The first column includes the above controls and origination
vintage fixed effects, the second column adds state fixed effects, and the third column
incorporates mortgage-based controls such as the CLTV ratio, loan balance, and borrower
documentation status. We find that an owner-occupancy misrepresentation increases the
likelihood of credit card default by about 7.6%. At the same time, truthfully reported non-owneroccupants have a likelihood of default on credit cards similar to truthfully reported owneroccupants. Throughout, the other covariates behave as we would expect, with lower FICO scores
and higher credit card utilization being correlated with higher credit card default rates. This
reinforces the conclusion that borrowers with misrepresented owner-occupancy status are a
distinct group of riskier borrowers.
Next, we repeat this analysis for reported and misreported second liens. Again we use the four
interaction terms employed in Table 4D. Panel B of Table 6 presents the results. Although the
controls behave as in Panel A, we observe that presence of a second lien is negatively correlated
with credit card default. The absolute effect ranges from –0.70% to –3.11%, a relative decrease
in the default probability of about 2% to 8%. This may be consistent with the notion that
mortgages with second liens are more likely to be fully documented and therefore tend to be
selected by better-quality borrowers. 21 As in Table 4D, we do not observe a consistent,
significant difference between loans with misreported and truthfully reported second lien.
This evidence, taken together with our findings from the previous section, supports the view that
there is significant variation among borrowers that have misrepresentations on their mortgages,
depending on which misrepresentation is identified. It appears that misrepresentations on the
dimension of owner-occupancy are indicative of borrowers with significantly worse
unobservable characteristics even compared with those who are truthfully reported as being nonowner-occupants. The case of misrepresentation of second liens is more subtle. We find that
while mortgages with misreported second liens perform significantly worse than those that
truthfully reported no presence of second liens, the borrowers associated with these loans appear
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Because banks often keep second liens on their own balance sheets, obtaining a second lien may be evidence of a
generally less risky borrower (see Lee et al., forthcoming). Our Misreported Second variable thus contains
information related to overall borrower credit quality as well as the misrepresentation itself. In examining credit card
defaults, it appears that the credit quality effect dominates, and hence the misrepresentation is correlated with a
lower level of default.
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to perform similarly on mortgages and credit cards as compared to borrowers with mortgages for
which the presence of such liens is correctly reported to investors.
Section VI: Were Misrepresentations Priced?
We now investigate whether misrepresentations on the two dimensions -- given that loans with
such misrepresentations were more likely to default ex post -- were priced by lenders and
investors. To shed light on this question, we first assess whether lenders charged higher interest
rates for loans that were misrepresented. Second, we examine whether pools with a higher
incidence of misrepresented collateral were perceived to be of lower quality by examining if
such pools had higher subordination levels protecting the safest AAA-tranches and higher
imputed yields compensating RMBS investors for the greater risk of these securities.
VI.A Misrepresentations and Mortgage Interest Rates
We begin by investigating whether lenders charged higher interest rates for loans with
misrepresented collateral, given that such loans were more likely to default ex post. In Panel A of
Table 7, we first examine whether lenders recognized that loans with misrepresented borrower
occupancy status were riskier and thus charged a higher interest rate on such loans. In particular,
we estimate a regression using interest rate as the dependent variable. In these regressions the
two variables of interest are the previously defined Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant and
Reported Non-Owner-Occupant dummy variables. The other covariates used in the regression
include the common variables that have been shown to be related to risk of the loan such as
FICO, LTV, whether the loan is an ARM, and so on. These coefficients are unreported for
brevity. The difference across specifications results from whether we also include half-year
origination (Column 2), state fixed effects (Column 3), and whether we cluster standard errors at
state level (Column 4).
As illustrated in Panel A of Table 7, we find that Reported Non-Owner-Occupant has a positive
and significant coefficient. This result is in line with the literature that finds that loans with nonowner-occupancy status are perceived to be riskier than those for owner-occupied properties.
The more interesting result, however, is that the coefficient on Misreported Non-OwnerOccupant is also positive and significant. This suggests that asset misrepresentations on this
margin were, to some extent, captured in interest rates charged by lenders.22 However, we note
that the increase in interest rates for misreported non-owner-occupants is smaller than for
truthfully reported ones (by around 13 basis points) -- even though our earlier analysis shows
22

While not reported, the other covariates behaved as expected. Indicators associated with higher risk, such as high
CLTV and low or no documentation, were correlated with higher interest rates, whereas high FICO scores and
balances led to lower interest rates. Regardless of the controls and type of specifications, the qualitative and
quantitative nature of results reported in the table remained the same.
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that loans with misreported non-owner-occupants also default significantly more than loans of
truthfully reported non-owner-occupants.
Next we repeat this analysis for reported and misreported second liens. For that purpose we
estimate similar specifications for mortgage interest rate, replacing Misreported Non-OwnerOccupant and Reported Non-Owner-Occupant with the four interaction terms as used in our
earlier analysis. Panel B of Table 7 presents the results. As expected, loans with a second lien
and a CLTV below 100 consistently receive lower interest rates than those with a CLTV of 100
or greater. When the presence of second lien is truthfully reported, the borrower receives a
higher interest rate, with increases ranging from 12 to 44 basis points, depending on CLTV and
other controls. More important, senior mortgages with misreported second liens carry, on
average, only slightly higher interest rates compared with loans which truthfully reported not
having second liens (the interest rate difference ranges from close to 0 to about 10 basis points) - even though our earlier analysis shows that such loans default at a much higher rate than loans
without second liens.
To further investigate the relationship between occupancy status and origination interest rates,
we plot the error terms for predicted interest rates using a sample and specification similar to
Column (3) of Panel A of Table 7, with the Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant and Reported
Non-Owner-Occupant variables removed. Panel C of Figure 2 shows the kernel density
distributions for these error terms, defined as the difference between the actual origination
interest rate and the predicted value, with loans grouped by actual occupancy status. Consistent
with our previous results, we observe that loans that truthfully reported as having non-owneroccupants receive higher interest rates (larger error terms) than those of misreported non-owneroccupants, who in turn have interest rates that are higher than loans that truthfully have owneroccupants.
We next repeat this analysis for reported and misreported second liens, now predicting interest
rates using a sample and specification similar to that of Column (3) of Panel B of Table 7, with
the second lien dummies and CLTV interaction terms removed. Panel D of Figure 2 shows the
kernel density plots for the error terms of these predicted rates, with loans grouped by their
second lien status. Again, consistent with our previous results, we observe that loans with
truthfully reported second liens receive higher interest rates than loans that truthfully report as
not having any second lien. Importantly, loans with misreported second liens have origination
interest rates that are only slightly higher than those that truthfully report as not having a second
lien.
Overall, the above evidence suggests that lenders were partly aware of the higher risk of
misrepresented loans as they charged higher interest rates on these loans. However, the interest
rate markups on misrepresented loans are much smaller relative to loans where the property was
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truthfully disclosed as not being primary residence of the borrower and as having a higher lien.
Therefore, relative to prevailing interest pricing, interest rates on misrepresented mortgages did
not fully reflect their higher default risk.
VI.B Misrepresentations and Pool Yields and Subordination Levels
We now turn to the second empirical test in this section, in which we assess whether these
misrepresentations were reflected in the prices that RMBS investors paid for the securities. In
other words, we examine if the RMBS pricing reflected the lower quality of deals that had a
larger share of misrepresented loans.
We note that investigating this notion is difficult for several reasons. First, we do not have access
to actual prices paid by the investors at the time of pool issuance. This is consistent with the
existing literature that uses model-generated prices rather than actual prices (e.g., prices
generated by Bloomberg or Intex) or indirect proxies such as subordination rates. Second, even if
we were to observe the pool tranche prices, we would need a structural model to assess whether
the variation in these prices is sufficient to compensate the investors for additional default risk.
Constructing such a structural model is difficult, as it requires, among other challenges, modeling
expectations of market participants while accounting for the complex structure of many pools
with multiple tranches and rules governing the distribution of cash flows.
Nevertheless, to shed some light on this question we start by investigating the statistical
relationship between the imputed average yield spreads on each pool and our measures of
collateral misreporting. To determine yield spread, we take the balance-weighted average coupon
for the pool from ABSNet and subtract the yield of a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond at the time of
securitization, as reported by the Federal Reserve. This is arguably a crude approximation of the
actual yields received by investors on MBS pools, but due to a lack of better data, such measures
have been used in a number of recent studies (e.g., Faltin-Traeger, Johnson, and Mayer 2010;
Demiroglu and James, forthcoming; He, Qian, and Strahan, forthcoming).
To run our pool-level analysis, we first restrict our sample to pools with at least 25% of loans for
which we can compute whether the loan was misrepresented or not (given our high quality match
restrictions). We have experimented with this threshold and found our qualitative inferences
similar with different thresholds. We then remove pools that do not have reliable coupon data on
ABSNet and are left with a sample of 353 pools containing approximately 698,000 mortgages. In
the following specifications, we consider three variables of interest separately: the percentage of
loans with misreported non-owner-occupant borrowers, the fraction of loans with misreported
second lien, and the percentage of mortgages with either a misreported non-owner-occupant
borrower or misreported second lien. To calculate these measures, we divide the number of loans
in the pool with the particular misrepresentation by the number of loans in the pool for which we
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could potentially identify such a misrepresentation. Other variables, such as CLTV ratios and
FICO scores, are taken as an average across all loans in the pool.
In Tables 8A through 8C, we run a series of pool-level regressions in which the dependent
variable is the pool’s average yield spread as described above. The variables of interest are the
percentage of misreported non-owner-occupants in Table 8A, the fraction of loans with
misreported second liens in Table 8B, and the fraction of loans having either misrepresentation
in Table 8C. The control variables include the pool-level means of common risk factors used in
the regressions in Table 2, such as mean FICO of the pool, average CLTV ratio, and the fraction
of loans with low documentation. Column (1) contains our base specification, Column (2) adds
vintage fixed effects, Column (3) includes the pool overcollateralization percentage, and fixed
effects for the largest six underwriters are added in Column (4).23 We find limited evidence that
misrepresentations were priced in by investors, as only misreported non-owner-occupants led to
statistically significantly higher yield spreads, and even this significance was only at a 90% level.
More importantly, the estimated effect is economically small. For instance, a one-standarddeviation increase in the pool of misreported non-owner-occupants from the mean level of
misrepresentation would be associated with only about a 4-basis-point increase in the yield
spread over 10-year Treasury bonds. For other measures, these estimated effects are not only
economically very small but also statistically insignificant.24
Next we also investigate whether pools with a higher share of misrepresentations have higher
subordination levels protecting AAA-rated tranches. Tables 9A through 9C run corresponding
regressions to those described above, now with the dependent variable being the lowest
subordination level in the pool given to a AAA-rated tranche. The control variables in Columns
(1) and (2) are defined identically as before. Column (3) includes the average initial interest rate
of loans in the pool, and Columns (4) and (5) add overcollateralization percentages and fixed
effects for the six largest underwriters, respectively. Again, we see little evidence that investors
were compensated for the greater risk of collateral involving a higher share of misreported nonowner-occupants and junior liens. As before, not only are these estimated effects economically
very small but they are statistically insignificant as well.
Overall, we view these results as providing little evidence that misrepresentations were reflected
in the initial prices of the RMBS securities. It is important to note that we do find evidence that
reported levels of average CLTV and fraction of non-owner occupied loans had a meaningful
relation with our price measures. For example, controlling for other observable pool
characteristics, a 10 percent absolute increase in reported average CLTV of the pool is associated
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We do not include full underwriter fixed effects due to the small sample size, but specifications with complete
underwriter fixed effects, grouping the smallest underwriters, yield similar results.
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For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in a share of Misreported Second in a pool at the mean level of
such misrepresentation would be associated with only about a 1.3-basis-point increase in yield.
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with about 0.31% increase in the imputed yield spread (more than 38% increase relative to the
mean spread) and about 1.7% increase in subordination level (more than 15% increase relative to
the mean subordination level). This suggests that had misrepresented loans been correctly
reported to investors, there would have been a meaningful impact of this disclosure on the prices
of these securities at their issuance.
VI.C Institutional Evidence for Misrepresentation and Mispricing of MBS
We now discuss some evidence that is consistent with the broad, systematic nature of the
findings uncovered by our study. Recently, there has been an increasing number of lawsuits filed
against the originators, servicers, and underwriters of RMBS that attribute the deterioration of
the performance of these securities to poor underwriting standards and misstated representations
and warranties (see Appendix B for a list of such lawsuits). Although representations and
warranties are also provided by the mortgage lenders, investors are holding the underwriters of
the securities accountable, claiming that these parties neglected their responsibility to verify the
stated quality of the collateral.25
While the specific claims vary by lawsuit, investors generally charge that loans in the securitized
pools frequently and materially failed to satisfy the representations and warranties made in
security prospectuses. Though these lawsuits do not present any clear systematic empirical
evidence, among the most frequently cited violations of representations and warranties are that
combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios were higher than stated, homes identified as owneroccupied were either non-owner occupied or second homes, property values were improperly
inflated, and unreported second liens secured by the property were present.26 For example, in a
representative suit filed by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (FHLB) against eight
security dealers (Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, RBS, Morgan Stanley,
Bank of America, and Countrywide Financial), FHLB claims that the security prospectuses
misled RMBS investors and did not accurately depict the underlying loans.27 Specifically, in
regard to owner-occupancy, the suit alleges:
These statements were materially untrue or misleading because (i) the stated number of
mortgage loans that were secured by primary residences was higher than the actual
number of loans in that category; (ii) the stated number of mortgage loans that were
secured by second homes was lower than the actual number of loans in that category; (iii)
the stated number of mortgage loans that were secured by investment properties was
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Underwriters often argue that they reported information that was provided to them by borrowers and primary
mortgage lenders and point to such qualifying clauses in the prospectuses. On the other hand, investors in these
securities contend that underwriters are also responsible for verifying that such information was correct instead of
merely reporting it.
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See Chris Gamaitoni, Jason Stewart, and Mike Turner, “Mortgage Repurchases Part II: Private Label RBMS
Investors Take Aim—Quantifying the Risks.” Compass Point Research & Trading, LLC, 17 August 2010.
27
FHLB of San Francisco vs. Credit Suisse Securities LLC et al., Superior Court of California, County of San
Francisco, No. CGC.10.497840.
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lower than the actual number of loans in that category; or (iv) the Defendants omitted to
state that the occupancy status of a significant number of the properties that secured the
mortgage loans in the collateral pool was misstated because of fraud.
Similarly, in regard to statements on the underlying mortgages’ LTV and CLTV ratios, the
FHLB charges:
These statements were materially untrue or misleading because (i) the stated LTVs and
CLTVs of a significant number of those mortgage loans were lower than the actual LTVs or
CLTVs; (ii) the Defendants omitted to state that the appraisals of a significant number of
the properties that secured the mortgage loans in the collateral pools were biased upward,
so that stated LTVs and CLTVs based on those appraisals were lower than the true LTVs
and CLTVs of those mortgage loans; or (iii) the stated CLTVs did not reflect second
mortgages on a significant number of the properties that secured the mortgage loans in the
collateral pools.28
Two issues emerge from this discussion. First, while the lawsuits alleging misrepresentations of
the type we analyzed are becoming increasingly common and are often anecdotally based, the
broad flavor of these assertions corroborates the large-scale systematic findings in this paper.29
Second, in most of these cases, RMBS investors argue that these misrepresentations were not
reflected in the initial prices of securities, which is also consistent with our analysis in this
section.
Section VII: Asset Misrepresentation, Underwriters and Regulation
Having established that the asset misrepresentations we focus on imposed potentially significant
risk on the investors of RMBS, we now demonstrate that there is substantial heterogeneity in the
extent of these misrepresentations across underwriters. We then try to assess whether the degree
of asset misrepresentation at the underwriter level varies with underwriter-specific factors related
to their business model and executive compensation structure. Finally, we end by assessing if
regional level variation in misrepresentation is related to regulatory environment in that region.
We start by visually demonstrating the presence of heterogeneity across underwriters in terms of
their propensity to misrepresent the asset quality on the dimension of misreported borrower
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These claims are very representative of other cases. See, for example, Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. et al. v.
DLJ Mortgage Capital Inc. et al., Supreme Court of New York, County of New York, No. 652837-2011, Federal
Housing Financing Agency et al. v. UBS Americas Inc. et al., U.S. District Court for S.D.N.Y., No. 2011-cv-5201;
No. 2011-cv-02341; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Morgan Stanley, Supreme Court of New York, County of
New York, No. 651360/2012.
29
These do not seem to be frivolous lawsuits with only a small chance of success. For example, in 2011 Bank of
America proposed $8.5 billion settlement with twenty-two large investors to resolve litigation concerning violations
of representations and warranties in more than $200 billion worth of outstanding MBS originally issued by
Countrywide Financial, which Bank of America purchased in 2008. See “In the matter of the application of The
Bank of New York Mellon,” New York State Supreme Court, No. 651786/2011.
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occupancy status. Specifically, we use a specification similar to Panel A of Table 2 with
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as the dependent variable and with underwriter fixed effects
in addition to the control variables. In Figure 3, we plot the estimated level of underwriter
misrepresentation, calculated using the underwriter fixed effects that are obtained from this
regression and fixing other controls at their means, along with the 95% confidence interval
(omitted category is Credit Suisse, with 4.43% of loans in pools it underwrote identified as
having misrepresented the owner-occupancy status of the borrower).
As can be seen, there is substantial heterogeneity across underwriters on the dimension of
misreported borrower occupancy status. For instance, loans in pools underwritten by Lehman
Brothers and Washington Mutual are about 4% more likely in absolute terms to contain
misreported non-owner-occupant properties as compared with loans in pools underwritten by
Credit Suisse. In contrast, Bank of America and HSBC underwrite pools that contain a similar
proportion of misrepresented collateral on the dimension of owner-occupancy as Credit Suisse.
Finally, recall that the mean level of misreported non-owner-occupants across loans in our
sample is 6.43%. Comparing the magnitudes of the fixed effects reported in Figure 3 against the
sample mean (displayed in a dashed line in Figure 3) also shows that the variation in
misrepresentation of collateral across underwriters is economically significant. An important
point to note is that although there is substantial heterogeneity across underwriters, a significant
degree of misrepresentation exists across all underwriters, which includes the most reputable
financial institutions.
Next, we repeat the analysis above using the underreporting of second liens as the dimension of
misrepresentation. In particular, we use a similar specification to Panel B of Table 2 with
Misreported Second as the dependent variable and with underwriter fixed effects in addition to
the control variables. In Figure 4, we plot the estimated level of underwriter misrepresentation,
calculated as above, along with the 95% confidence interval (the omitted category is Credit
Suisse, with 3.37% of loans in pools it underwrote having misreported second liens.)
As is evident from Figure 4, there is significant variation among underwriters’ propensity to
securitize loans with misreported second lien. For instance, loans in pools underwritten by
Lehman Brothers were more than 13% more likely in absolute terms to contain misreported
second liens relative to loans in pools that were underwritten by Credit Suisse. Similarly, Merrill
Lynch, Deutsche Bank, Nomura, and UBS underwrote pools that contain a similar proportion of
misrepresented collateral on the dimension of reported second liens as Credit Suisse. Again, note
that the mean level of misreported second liens in our sample is 7.13%. Comparing the
magnitudes of fixed effects shown in Figure 4 with this mean (displayed in a dashed line in
Figure 4) also shows that the variation in misrepresentation of collateral across underwriters is
economically significant.
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Finally, we study misrepresentation across both dimensions simultaneously. Specifically, we
construct a variable, Either Misreported, which takes the value of 1 if the loan has a misreported
second lien, a misreported non-owner-occupant borrower, or both. We then regress this variable
against the controls used in Panel B of Table 2, as well as underwriter fixed effects, using the
sample of loans that are reported as having owner-occupied properties and/or have no reported
second lien. In Figure 5, we plot the level of underwriter misrepresentation, calculated as above,
along with the 95% confidence interval (the omitted category is Credit Suisse, with 5.69% of
loans in pools it underwrote having a misrepresentation on either of the dimensions).
Consistent with the previous results, we observe a sizeable degree of heterogeneity in the share
of misrepresented loans across underwriters with all underwriters having violation levels
significantly greater than 0. For loans in pools underwritten by Countrywide and Lehman
Brothers, there was a greater than 10% chance that one or both of the occupancy and second lien
statuses were not correctly reported to investors. More than one in seven loans in pools
underwritten by Lehman Brothers contained at least one misrepresentation. Conversely,
underwriters such as Bank of America and Morgan Stanley underwrote pools with a roughly
similar level of misrepresentations as those underwritten by Credit Suisse.
In the next set of analysis, we assess how the likelihood of misrepresentation on the dimensions
we have been analyzing varies with underwriter characteristics. We focus on several measures
that relate to the nature of the underwriter’s business, such as the relative importance of the
mortgage underwriting business for the underwriter, the number of years of experience in
underwriting subprime deals, and whether the underwriter is a commercial bank. In addition, we
focus on the internal organization of underwriters, focusing on the nature of compensation
contracts and the importance a given firm places on its risk management. Both these factors have
been shown in the previous literature to impact the risk-taking and screening decisions of banks
(e.g., Cheng et al. 2010; Ellul et al., forthcoming; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig 2009). In
particular, to capture the nature of compensation we construct the average ratio of cash bonus to
salary of its top executives as in Cheng et al. 2010. In addition, we use the Ellul et al. index of
the importance of risk management inside the organization. The details on construction of all
these measures and the data sources are provided in the Data Appendix.
The specifications and control variables used are similar to those used in Table 2. Column (1) of
Table 10 reports the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as the dependent variable,
Column (2) reports the results using the Misreported Second misrepresentation, and Column (3)
shows the results where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a loan has any of these two
misrepresentations, and is 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the underwriter level.
As we observe from Table 10, there is a very weak relation between the degree of asset
misrepresentation at the underwriter level and underwriter-specific factors. We do find some
evidence that the propensity to misrepresent is moderated for underwriters with more diversified
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business outside of the RMBS market. However, the effect is only marginally statistically
significant and only for the misreported non-owner-occupant misrepresentation. Asset
misrepresentation is less prevalent among commercial banks, underwriters with more RMBS
experience, and underwriters with more high-powered incentives given to its top management
and better internal risk management. However, none of these effects is statistically significant.
We also investigate how the level of misrepresentation aggregated at the state level relates to
regulatory environment in that state. We obtain estimates of state level misrepresentation by
estimating state fixed effects from the specification of likelihood of either misrepresentation that
we used in Table 3. In tests, unreported for brevity, we explore how these state fixed effects
relate to empirical measures of regulatory environment. For this purpose we employed the state
regulator leniency index of Agarwal et al. (2012). We find limited evidence that states with more
lax regulators had higher share of misrepresented loans. While the association is positive it is not
statistically significant. (coefficient is 1.20; t-statistic of 0.29). We also examined if there is a
relation between misrepresentations in a region and the quality of institutions in that region by
using the corruption and quality of institutions indices that are discussed in Agarwal et al. (2012).
We find limited evidence for such a relation as well. Overall, the propensity to misrepresent
seems to be unrelated to regulatory environment in a region.
Section VIII: Discussion
The results in our paper indicate the presence of sizeable asset misrepresentations even among
the most reputable underwriters. Thus, the existing market arrangements, including the
reputational concerns and high-powered explicit incentives that are common in these institutions,
seemed to have had limited ability to eliminate such behavior. In addition, this behavior also
escaped regulators who were in charge of safeguarding rights of investors. The latter finding may
suggest that the current level of protection of investors in capital markets, especially those with
more passive investors, like the high-grade investment debt market, may be inadequate. Given
that the problem we document is pervasive, any solution needs to impact the entire industry (e.g.,
culture). What this solution should be, or the exact form it should take, is a fruitful area for
further research.
VIII.A Where does misrepresentation occur in the supply chain of credit?
Our earlier analysis suggests that lenders were partly aware of the higher risk of misrepresented
loans since they charged higher interest rates on these loans. Our data do not allow us to
investigate where in the supply chain of credit (i.e., borrower, lender, or underwriter) the
misrepresentation took place. This is a difficult issue to analyze because it requires knowing
about the entire information set of various agents responsible in the chain of credit. However, we
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can shed some light on this issue by providing limited evidence based on bank-level data from a
subprime mortgage lender (New Century).
The advantage of this dataset is that it contains the loan characteristics that were recorded by the
lender at loan origination. This allows us to assess whether loans backed by misreported nonowner-occupied properties were correctly recognized as for non-owner-occupied properties by
loan officers and brokers of New Century. Similarly, we can assess whether New Century was
aware of the presence of second liens for loans for which such presence was not reported to
RMBS investors.30 Of all loans in this sample that we identified as having misreported nonowner-occupied status, none was reported as being for non-owner-occupied properties in the
New Century database. This evidence suggests that the misrepresentation concerning owneroccupancy status was made early in the origination process, possibly by the borrower or broker
originating the loan on behalf of New Century. It may likely reflect screening practices on the
side of the mortgage originator that were not corrected by the underwriter.
In contrast, of all mortgages identified as having misreported second lien status to investors,
93.3% had a second lien reported in the New Century database. This confirms that the lenders
were often aware of the presence of second liens, and hence their underreporting occurs later in
the process of intermediation. This result is also consistent with our earlier findings that these
loans are more likely to be fully documented.31 Importantly, in both Panels B and C of Table 11,
we find that similar to our overall sample, misreported loans in the matched New Century data
default at a much higher rate relative to similar loans. This is the case despite misreported loans
being of better quality on observables (such as FICO).
Overall, we find that misrepresentation concerning owner-occupancy status was made early in
the origination process, possibly by the borrower or broker originating a loan on behalf of the
lending institution. In contrast, the lender was aware of the presence of second liens, and hence
their misreporting likely occurs later in the supply chain. One must interpret these findings with
caution, however, since asserting the same holds for all the lenders requires one to assume that
lending practices in New Century were representative of the industry.
VIII.B How large are the effects?
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To conduct this analysis, we merge the New Century database with the BlackBox-Equifax dataset. This matching
is done using "Loan-id" variables that are identical in the two databases (i.e., there is no error in matching between
these datasets). After merging the New Century dataset with our database we have a sample of 3,160 loans that
were reported to investors as being for owner-occupied properties. Of these, our method identifies 148 loans (4.7%)
as misrepresented non-owner-occupants. In addition, 10,924 loans report no second liens to investors. Of these, our
method identifies 1,279 loans (11.71%) as having a misreported second lien. Table 11B-C presents summary
statistics for these loans.
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This exercise also cross-validates our methodology as almost all loans identified by us as having misreported
second liens do indeed have associated second liens in the internal New Century database.
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Our estimates can be used to quantify the cost of these misrepresentations to RMBS investors.
We note that, based on our measures, about 9.1% of loans have some misrepresentation (a
misreported owner-occupancy status or misreported second lien). Moreover we find that this
estimate applies to about 85% of loans in our data since loans that truthfully report that they are
non-owner occupied, have second liens, or for which investor status and CLTV are missing are
not part of our analysis. Hence, assuming that our estimates are broadly applicable to the entire
stock of outstanding non-agency securitized loans just prior to the subprime crisis (more than $2
trillion), such misrepresentations could impact mortgages with combined outstanding balance of
up to $160 billion. This simple calculation implies that enforcement of representations and
warranties by investors in response to these misrepresentations could result in significant costs to
intermediaries.32 Of course, not all of the misrepresented loans may eventually default. However,
given the significantly higher default rates of these mortgages, such repurchases could still result
in a substantial loss to intermediaries.33
Note, however, that since we focus only on two easy to quantify cases of asset misrepresentation,
this estimate is likely a lower bound on the actual degree of misrepresentation and consequently
the amount of assets facing possibility of forced repurchases. Likewise, asset misrepresentations
by intermediaries could also induce other losses beyond those directly incurred by the investors - for instance, by disrupting the allocation of capital by such intermediaries in the economy.
Finally, such misrepresentations, by overstating the true quality of assets, might have had a
meaningful impact on fueling the demand for these securities. Quantifying such effects is a
fruitful area of future research.
VIII.C Caveats
A few caveats about our analysis are worth discussing. First, note that our inference is based on
the trustee reports data as provided by BlackBox. While the trustee reports are the primary
source of data used in this market to assess the quality of collateral backing RMBS, one could
argue that an average investor may have been unsophisticated and relied on more basic data to
make assessment about the collateral quality backing the RMBS. Our analysis is based on an
investor who would use the detailed loan level information that would be available from the
trustee at the time of sale of the pool. Thus, the extent of misrepresentations for unsophisticated
investors would have been even higher. Alternatively, one could argue that investors may have
relied on other sources of data including potentially informative RMBS ratings, not captured in
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We note that it is possible that not all misrepresentations we identify would result in legal liability of some
intermediaries given the specific nature of their contracts with investors and their interpretation by the courts.
33
For example, assume that over the course of the crisis about a third of non-agency securitized loans will be
foreclosed and that, in line with our estimates, this rate would be 60% higher for misrepresented loans. This would
result in foreclosure of misrepresented mortgages with about $85 billion of outstanding principal. Assuming that the
recovery rate on these loans in the event of foreclosure would be equal to about 25% of outstanding loan balance,
capturing declines in house prices and some deadweight costs of foreclosures, the forced repurchases (at par) of
these loans would result in the overall net loss to financial intermediaries of more than $60 billion.
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our database that could allow them to understand the true characteristics of these assets. 34
Though this scenario is possible, it seems unlikely as we find little evidence that
misrepresentations we identify were priced by investors in the securities at their issuance.
Second, it is possible that our inferences are confounded due to matching error between the
datasets that contains actual loan characteristics and that containing characteristics reported to
investors is critical for constructing measures of misrepresentation. As discussed in detail, our
extensive analysis suggests that the misrepresentations we identify are not likely to be an artifact
of matching error between the datasets that were merged by a credit bureau.
We note that our inferences are based on a sample of loans that does not include all non-agency
securitized mortgages. While the sample used in our study is sizeable (roughly 2 million loans)
and is quite comparable to the overall sample of mortgages (see Appendix A for details), it is
possible that the intensity of asset misrepresentation -- for instance, across states or across
underwriters -- in the population could differ from the one we document. However, our analysis
does establish that a significant level of asset quality misrepresentation already exists when
examining just two dimensions of asset quality.
It is possible that underwriters may have not known about some aspects of the misrepresentation
that occurred at the level of the originator. Related, one could argue that contractual disclosures
may have included statements that limit the responsibility of underwriters regarding the quality
of disclosed information. For example, in the case of owner-occupancy status, underwriters
could argue that they were merely reporting the intent to occupy the property as disclosed by the
borrower. In fact, some pool prospectus documents state that borrower’s disclosure could serve
as the basis for the owner-occupancy status of a loan and that there may be some leeway in the
classification of the borrower as owner-occupant (e.g., some investor properties could be
classified as owner-occupied properties if borrowers reside in them for considerable part of the
year). Such arguments are harder to apply to our second measure of misrepresentation
(misreported second liens) since, as argued earlier, it involves information distortion within the
boundaries of the financial industry. Regardless, by classifying misrepresentation to an
underwriter, we are implicitly taking a stand that these firms, as part of the process of sale,
should have collected and verified information regarding the quality of the underlying collateral
backing these securities.
Finally our findings that the propensity to misrepresent loans is pervasive among reputable firms
and is largely unrelated to underwriter level measures such as incentives for top management or
quality of risk management inside these firms should not be taken to imply that the quality of
lending and intermediation is unrelated to these factors. We explored the relation between the
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See Rajan et al (2012) for evidence that rating models, because they ignore the changed nature of intermediation,
may have been generating systematic errors well before the crisis.
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extent of misrepresentation and the equilibrium level of these factors in the data. It is, of course,
possible that the variation in these factors across the firms in our data may be insufficient to
identify such a relationship. Moreover, while we have focused on one specific aspect of lending
and intermediation, there remain several other functions, some of which have been shown by
prior literature to be related to these factors (e.g., see Keys et al. 2009 and Elul et al. forthcoming
for screening during origination by lenders and for intermediary risk taking, respectively). More
work is needed to understand the internal organization of financial intermediaries which makes
some activities respond to governance mechanisms while leaving others relatively unaffected.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Percent of Misrepresented Loans
The table presents summary statistics of key variables for mortgages reported as owner-occupied (Panel A) and
loans reported as having no second liens (Panel B) to the RMBS trustee (loans reported as such in the BlackBox
dataset). The sample consists of these loans merged with high confidence level with the credit bureau data. Interest
Rate is the loan interest rate at origination in percentage terms. FICO is the variable capturing the borrower’s FICO
credit score at loan origination. Balance is the initial loan balance (in thousands of dollars). CLTV is the loan’s
origination combined loan-to-value ratio in percentage terms. No Cash Out Refi and Cash Out Refi are dummies that
take a value of 1 if the loan purpose was a no cash out refinancing or cash out refinancing, respectively, and are 0
otherwise. Low or No Doc. is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the loan was originated with no or limited
documentation, and is 0 otherwise. ARM and Option ARM are dummies that take a value of 1 if the loan type was an
ARM or option ARM, respectively, and are 0 otherwise.
Panel A: Sample of Loans Reported for Owner-Occupied Properties
Interest Rate
FICO
Balance
CLTV
Purchase
No Cash Out Refi
Cash Out Refi
Low or No Doc.
ARM

Mean
6.60
680.
324.6
83.72
0.49
0.13
0.35
0.46
0.52

SD
2.02
73.20
248.3
11.71
0.50
0.34
0.48
0.49
0.49

Option ARM

0.10

0.30

Number of Loans
Percent of Loans for Misreported
Non-Owner-Occupants
Percent of Fully Documented Loans for
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupants

1,563,223
6.42
4.79

Panel B: Sample of Loans Reported as Having No Second Liens
Interest Rate
FICO
Balance
CLTV
Purchase
No Cash Out Refi
Cash Out Refi
Low or No Doc.
ARM
Option ARM
Number of Loans
Percent of Loans with Misreported
Second Liens

Mean
6.45
663.5
293.1
78.93
0.36
0.12
0.50
0.51
0.47

SD
2.42
76.90
238.9
9.95
0.48
0.32
0.50
0.50
0.49

0.16
854,959

0.37

7.13

Percent of Fully Documented Loans with
Misreported Second Liens

7.93

Percent of Loans with Misreported
Second Liens (including HELOCs)

13.64
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Table 2: Misrepresentations by Home Price Changes and Loan Volume
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is the mean of the given asset
misrepresentation at the MSA level. Column (1) shows the results for misreported owner-occupants, Column (2)
shows the results for misreported second liens, and Column (3) shows the results for either misrepresentation.
Annualized HPI Growth, '01–'04 and Annualized HPI Growth, '05–'06 are variables representing the annualized
MSA-level HPI growth from 2001 to 2004 and 2005 to 2006, respectively, computed using FHFA’s HPI measure.
Share of 2005–2007 Loan Originations is a variable defined as the number of loans originated in the MSA from
2005 to 2007 divided by the total number of loans originated over this time period, using the overall BlackBox loan
sample. The estimates show the effect of a one standard deviation change and are in percentage terms; t-statistics are
in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Annualized HPI Growth, '01–
'04

(1)
Misreported NonOwner-Occupant
0.869***
(7.79)

(2)
Misreported
Second Lien
-1.432***
(-7.72)

(3)
Either
Misreported
0.0575
(0.43)

Annualized HPI Growth, '05–
'06

0.486***
(4.61)

-0.241
(-1.37)

0.323**
(2.54)

Share of 2005–2007 Loan
Originations

0.365***
(3.62)

0.628***
(3.75)

0.509***
(4.20)

381
4.604
0.364

381
7.513
0.188

381
7.929
0.0929

Number of MSAs
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared
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Table 3: Misrepresentations and Loan Characteristics
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the loan has
the given misrepresentation, and is 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant
as the dependent variable, while Panel B shows results with Misreported Second Lien as the dependent variable.
Column (2) includes controls for the level of merge confidence expressed by Equifax. Column (3) includes loan
origination half-year fixed effects with 2005 omitted. The estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Interest Rate

Panel A: Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant
(1)
(2)
0.821***
0.812***
(55.80)
(55.22)

(3)
0.786***
(49.00)

FICO

0.00922***
(24.97)

0.00907***
(24.57)

0.00902***
(24.27)

Balance

0.00250***
(28.60)

0.00262***
(30.00)

0.00256***
(28.73)

CLTV

0.0286***
(14.27)

0.0274***
(13.70)

0.0267***
(13.34)

No Cash Out Refi

-5.497***
(-89.01)

-5.499***
(-89.12)

-5.536***
(-89.40)

Cash Out Refi

-6.214***
(-125.34)

-6.266***
(-126.46)

-6.286***
(-126.74)

Low or No Doc.

2.778***
(65.74)

2.824***
(66.86)

2.821***
(66.70)

ARM

2.279***
(52.14)

2.153***
(49.22)

2.173***
(49.41)

Option ARM

7.295***
(79.65)

7.229***
(78.99)

7.126***
(74.90)

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,563,223
6.426
0.0283

No
1,563,223
6.426
0.0300

Yes
1,563,223
6.426
0.0301

Confidence Match Controls
Half-Year Origination Cohorts
Number of Loans
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared
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Table 3 (Continued):

Interest Rate

Panel B: Misreported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
-0.624***
-0.619***
(-30.89)
(-30.65)

(3)
-0.548***
(-25.13)

FICO

0.00418***
(8.94)

0.00449***
(9.60)

0.00523***
(11.11)

Balance

-0.00804***
(-65.46)

-0.00810***
(-65.92)

-0.00773***
(-62.17)

CLTV

-0.163***
(-53.35)

-0.163***
(-53.48)

-0.161***
(-52.84)

No Cash Out Refi

-8.181***
(-89.21)

-8.202***
(-89.45)

-7.990***
(-86.84)

Cash Out Refi

-12.01***
(-186.03)

-12.03***
(-186.38)

-11.93***
(-184.70)

Low or No Doc.

-1.487***
(-25.08)

-1.501***
(-25.33)

-1.504***
(-25.35)

ARM

6.355***
(99.27)

6.406***
(99.97)

6.397***
(99.92)

Option ARM

-2.825***
(-23.57)

-2.797***
(-23.34)

-2.630***
(-21.09)

No

Yes

Yes

No
854,959
7.131
0.0643

No
854,959
7.131
0.0646

Yes
854,959
7.131
0.0668

Confidence Match Controls
Half-Year Origination Cohorts
Number of Loans
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared
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Table 4: Time-Series Evolution of Misrepresentations
The table presents the OLS coefficient estimates for the half-year origination vintage fixed effects included in
Column (3) of Table 2. The excluded categories are loans originated in 2005. The dependent variable takes a value
of 1 if the loan has the given misrepresentation, and is 0 otherwise. Column (1) shows the results with Misreported
Non-Owner-Occupant as the dependent variable, while Column (2) shows results with Misreported Second Lien as
the dependent variable. The estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
***
p < 0.01.
(1)
Misreported NonOwner-Occupant
0.0126
(0.24)

(2)
Misreported
Second Lien
2.213***
(29.72)

Originated in 2006H2

0.183***
(3.21)

-0.444***
(-5.58)

Originated in 2007H1

0.456***
(6.86)

-1.820***
(-18.62)

Originated in 2007H2

-0.773***
(-4.58)

-3.993***
(-15.23)

Number of Loans
2005 Mean Percent Misrepresented

1,563,223
5.90

854,959
7.73

Originated in 2006H1
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Table 5: Misrepresentations and Loan Default
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the
mortgage ever defaults (ever goes 90 days past due on payments) in the first two years since origination, and is 0
otherwise. Panel A shows the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as a control variable. Panel B shows
results with Misreported Second Lien as a control variable. Panel C shows the results with both Misreported NonOwner-Occupant and Reported Non-Owner-Occupant as control variables, where the excluded category is loans
truthfully reported as for owner-occupied properties. Panel D shows the results with Misreported Second x CLTV
>= 100, Misreported Second x CLTV < 100, Reported Second x CLTV >= 100, and Reported Second x CLTV <
100 as control variables, where the excluded category are loans that truthfully reported no second liens. The CLTV
term in these interactions takes a value of 1 if the loan has a CLTV ratio in the appropriate range, and is 0 otherwise.
“Other Controls” include origination variables used in Table 2 such as FICO, interest rates, and LTV ratios. Squared
and cubed terms for FICO and CLTV ratios are also included to account for potential nonlinear effects. The
estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Panel A: Mortgage Default and Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant
All Years
2005
2006H1
2006H2
Misreported Non-Owner9.35***
4.04***
10.13***
15.58***
Occupant
(85.49)
(32.73)
(40.66)
(51.35)

2007H1
14.00***
(36.35)

2007H2
14.38***
(15.25)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination
Cohorts
Number of Loans
Percent Default
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

1,563,223
15.28
6.426
0.157

743,827
7.150
5.904
0.0727

327,128
17.02
6.903
0.108

282,904
26.51
7.167
0.149

187,352
27.36
6.535
0.184

22,012
17.11
6.528
0.214

Panel B: Mortgage Default and Misreported Second Lien
All Years
2005
2006H1
2006H2
10.15***
7.04***
13.40***
16.14***
(70.38)
(46.29)
(42.46)
(34.49)

2007H1
16.72***
(22.17)

2007H2
6.65**
(2.36)

Misreported Second Lien

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination
Cohorts
Number of Loans
Percent Default
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

854,959
14.58
7.131
0.160

445,432
7.427
7.730
0.0755

165,183
16.00
9.011
0.126

146,601
24.28
5.535
0.151

88,207
30.79
3.788
0.183

9,536
24.55
1.992
0.207
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Table 5 (Continued):
Panel C: Mortgage Default and Misreported versus Reported Non-Owner Occupants
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Misreported Non-Owner10.72***
9.992***
9.48***
9.48***
Occupant
(96.16)
(92.23)
(87.74)
(13.39)
4.02***
(53.29)

3.57***
(48.64)

3.45***
(46.88)

3.45***
(5.60)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination
Cohorts

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,827,497
14.89
6.424
0.103

No
1,827,497
14.89
6.424
0.153

No
1,827,497
14.89
6.424
0.161

Yes
1,827,497
14.89
6.424
0.161

Reported Non-OwnerOccupant

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Percent Default
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared

Panel D: Mortgage Default and Misreported versus Reported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
(3)
Misreported Second x CLTV <
5.075***
5.725***
6.404***
100
(17.68)
(20.51)
(23.07)

(4)
6.404***
(13.23)

Reported Second x CLTV < 100

8.627***
(70.28)

6.252***
(52.22)

6.636***
(55.65)

6.636***
(7.09)

Misreported Second x CLTV >=
100

9.618***
(48.16)

10.19***
(52.44)

10.97***
(56.73)

10.97***
(7.94)

Reported Second x CLTV >= 100

15.50***
(139.00)

13.26***
(121.55)

14.02***
(128.55)

14.02***
(6.08)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination Cohorts

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,109,250
17.10
5.212
0.113

No
1,109,250
17.10
5.212
0.162

No
1,109,250
17.10
5.212
0.172

Yes
1,109,250
17.10
5.212
0.172

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Percent Default
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared
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Table 6: Misrepresentations and Defaults on Credit Cards
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the
borrower ever defaults on credit card debt (goes 60 days past due on payments) during the first two years since
mortgage origination, and is 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant and
Reported Non-Owner-Occupant as control variables, while Panel B displays results with Misreported Second x
CLTV >= 100, Misreported Second x CLTV < 100, Reported Second x CLTV >= 100, and Reported Second x
CLTV < 100 as control variables. Column (1) includes FICO and controls related to credit card debt, such as
utilization and monthly payments. Column (2) incorporates state fixed effects. Column (3) includes the full
mortgage controls, such as loan balance and interest rate, used in Table 4. Column (4) clusters standard errors by
state. The estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Credit Card Default and Misreported versus Reported Non-Owner-Occupants
(1)
(2)
(3)
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant
7.636***
7.305***
5.959***
(49.02)
(46.98)
(38.51)

(4)
5.959***
(18.68)

0.433***
(4.25)

1.144***
(11.12)

-1.024***
(-9.69)

-1.024***
(-2.81)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mortgage Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,709,386
37.28
6.580
0.0760

No
1,709,386
37.28
6.580
0.0831

No
1,709,386
37.28
6.580
0.112

Yes
1,709,386
37.28
6.580
0.112

Reported Non-Owner-Occupant

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Percent Default
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared
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Table 6 (Continued):
Panel B: Credit Card Default and Misreported versus Reported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
(3)
Misreported Second x CLTV <
-3.105***
-2.640***
-1.814***
100
(-8.09)
(-6.91)
(-4.77)

(4)
-1.814***
(-3.07)

Reported Second x CLTV < 100

-2.759***
(-17.63)

-2.462***
(-15.76)

-1.601***
(-9.84)

-1.601***
(-3.83)

Misreported Second x CLTV >=
100

-2.462***
(-9.37)

-1.155***
(-4.41)

-2.123***
(-7.83)

-2.123***
(-3.20)

Reported Second x CLTV >= 100

-2.023***
(-16.27)

-0.696***
(-5.56)

-0.854***
(-5.63)

-0.854
(-1.40)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mortgage Controls

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,023,725
38.36
5.233
0.0769

No
1,023,725
38.36
5.233
0.0859

No
1,023,725
38.36
5.233
0.109

Yes
1,023,725
38.36
5.233
0.109

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Percent CC 60 DPD
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared
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Table 7: Misrepresentation and Mortgage Interest Rates at Origination
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is the mortgage’s interest rate
at origination. Panel A shows the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant and Reported Non-OwnerOccupant as control variables. Panel B shows results with Misreported Second x CLTV >= 100, Misreported
Second x CLTV < 100, Reported Second x CLTV >= 100, and Reported Second x CLTV < 100 as control variables.
“Other Controls” include origination variables used in Table 4, such as FICO, interest rates, and CLTV ratios.
Column (1) includes only these variables. Column (2) incorporates half-year origination fixed effects. Column (3)
also includes property state fixed effects. Column (4) clusters standard errors by state. The estimates are in
percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Interest Rates at Origination and Misreported versus Reported Non-Owner-Occupants
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Misreported Non-Owner0.258***
0.212***
0.229***
0.229***
Occupant
(60.45)
(54.38)
(59.01)
(41.94)
0.393***
(136.13)

0.365***
(137.82)

0.351***
(132.93)

0.351***
(17.30)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination
Cohorts

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1,827,497
6.563
6.424
0.611

No
1,827,497
6.563
6.424
0.674

No
1,827,497
6.563
6.424
0.680

Yes
1,827,497
6.563
6.424
0.680

Reported Non-OwnerOccupant

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Mean Interest Rate
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared
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Table 7 (Continued):
Panel B: Interest Rates at Origination and Misreported versus Reported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
(3)
Misreported Second x CLTV <
-0.0281***
-0.00237
-0.00358
100
(-2.62)
(-0.24)
(-0.36)

(4)
-0.00358
(-0.11)

Reported Second x CLTV <
100

0.267***
(58.01)

0.121***
(28.32)

0.124***
(29.12)

0.124***
(3.16)

Misreported Second x CLTV
>= 100

0.0721***
(9.64)

0.0956***
(13.80)

0.0882***
(12.80)

0.0882
(1.04)

Reported Second x CLTV >=
100

0.441***
(105.74)

0.295***
(75.92)

0.290***
(74.52)

0.290**
(2.32)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination Cohorts

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
1109250
6.654
5.212
0.624

No
1109250
6.654
5.212
0.677

No
1109250
6.654
5.212
0.682

Yes
1109250
6.654
5.212
0.682

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Mean Interest Rate
Percent Misrepresented
R-Squared
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Table 8: Misrepresentations and Yields: Pool Level Regressions
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is the pool’s issuance yield
spread (in percentage terms), defined as the weighted average issuance coupon for the pool minus the U.S. Treasury
yield at issuance. Panel A shows the results with Percent Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as a control variable.
Percent Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant is defined as the number of loans in the pool identified as being backed
by misreported non-owner-occupied properties divided by the number of loans in the pool reported as for owneroccupied properties. Panel B shows the results with Percent Misreported Second as a control variable. Percent
Misreported Second is defined as the number of loans in the pool identified as having a misreported second lien
divided by the number of loans in the pool that report that no second lien is present. Panel C shows the results with
Percent Either Misreported as a control variable. Percent Either Misreported is defined as the number of loans in
the pool identified as having either misrepresentation divided by the number of loans in the pool reported as for
owner-occupied properties and/or reported as having no second lien. Other controls include the pool-level means of
origination variables used in Table 2, such as FICO and CLTV ratios, although loan interest rates are excluded.
Column (1) includes only these controls. Column (2) incorporates half-year vintage fixed effects. Column (3)
includes controls for the overcollateralization of the pool. Column (4) includes underwriter fixed effects for the six
underwriters with twenty or more pools in our sample. The estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Pool Yield Spreads and Percent Misreported Non-Owner-Occupants
(1)
(2)
(3)
Percent Misreported Non-Owner0.0211*
0.0209*
0.0204*
Occupants
(1.81)
(1.78)
(1.74)

(4)
0.0189
(1.57)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Yield Spread
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
0.830
6.473
0.268

Yes
353
0.830
6.473
0.268

Yes
353
0.830
6.473
0.273

Yes
353
0.830
6.473
0.281
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Table 8 (Continued):
Panel B: Pool Yield Spreads and Percent Misreported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
(3)
Percent Misreported Second
0.00342
0.00373
0.00416
(0.79)
(0.85)
(0.94)

(4)
0.00339
(0.73)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Yield Spread
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
0.830
4.191
0.262

Yes
353
0.830
4.191
0.262

Yes
353
0.830
4.191
0.269

Yes
353
0.830
4.191
0.277

Panel C: Pool Yield Spreads and Either Misrepresentation
(1)
(2)
(3)
Percent Either Misreported
0.00564
0.00584
0.00611
(1.38)
(1.42)
(1.47)

(4)
0.00539
(1.24)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Yield Spread
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
0.830
8.870
0.265

Yes
353
0.830
8.870
0.265

Yes
353
0.830
8.870
0.272

Yes
353
0.830
8.870
0.279
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Table 9: Misrepresentations and Subordination Level -- Pool Level Analysis
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is the pool’s AAA
subordination level (in percentage terms), defined as the lowest subordination level given to a tranche in the pool
that received a credit rating of AAA. All panels use the same sample of pools used in Table 8. Panel A shows the
results with Percent Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as a control variable. Panel B shows the results with
Percent Misreported Second as a control variable. Panel C shows the results with Percent Either Misreported as a
control variable. Other controls are defined as in Table 8. Column (1) includes only these controls. Column (2)
incorporates half-year vintage fixed effects. Column (3) adds the pool-level average interest rate as a control
variable. Column (4) includes controls for the overcollateralization of the pool. Column (5) includes underwriter
fixed effects for the six underwriters with twenty or more pools in our sample. The estimates are in percentage
terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Panel A: Pool AAA Subordination and Percent Misreported Non-Owner-Occupants
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Percent Misreported Non-0.0512
-0.0401
-0.0597
-0.0305
Owner-Occupant
(-0.82)
(-0.64)
(-0.95)
(-0.51)

*

(5)
-0.0225
(-0.37)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Interest Rate

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Subordination
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
8.444
6.473
0.875

Yes
353
8.444
6.473
0.877

Yes
353
8.444
6.473
0.878

Yes
353
8.444
6.473
0.892

Yes
353
8.444
6.473
0.896

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9 (Continued):
Panel B: Pool AAA Subordination and Percent Misreported Second Lien
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Percent Misreported Second
0.0227
0.0157
0.0112
0.0313
(0.98)
(0.67)
(0.48)
(1.41)

(5)
0.0140
(0.60)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Interest Rate

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Subordination
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
8.444
4.191
0.875

Yes
353
8.444
4.191
0.877

Yes
353
8.444
4.191
0.878

Yes
353
8.444
4.191
0.893

Yes
353
8.444
4.191
0.896

Panel C: Pool AAA Subordination and Either Misrepresentation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Percent Either Misreported
0.0205
0.0161
0.0102
0.0300
(0.94)
(0.74)
(0.46)
(1.43)

(5)
0.0161
(0.74)

Half-Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Interest Rate

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Overcollateralization

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Top 6 Underwriter FE

No

No

No

No

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Deals
Mean Subordination
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
353
8.444
8.870
0.875

Yes
353
8.444
8.870
0.877

Yes
353
8.444
8.870
0.878

Yes
353
8.444
8.870
0.893

Yes
353
8.444
8.870
0.896
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Table 10: Heterogeneity of Misrepresentation Among Underwriters
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the loan
has the given violation and is 0 otherwise. Column (1) shows the results with Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant as
the dependent variable, Column (2) shows results with Misreported Second as the dependent variable, and Column
(3) shows the results with misrepresentation on either dimension as the dependent variable (Either Misreported).
Underwriter RMBS Volume/Assets is the volume of loans in our base sample underwritten in 2005 by the loan’s deal
underwriter divided by the underwriter’s assets as of the end of 2005. Underwriter Years in Subprime is the number
of years between the loan’s securitization year and the first subprime deal underwritten by the deal’s underwriter,
excluding deals prior to 1999. Commercial Bank Underwriter is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the underwriter is
a commercial bank and is 0 otherwise. RMI is an index of the risk-management strength of an institution based on
Elul et al. (2012). Bonus to Salary Ratio is the ratio of cash bonus to salary for the underwriter’s five highest-paid
executives. The description of these measures in discussed in Appendix A. “Other Controls” include origination
variables used in Column (3) of Table 2, such as FICO, interest rate, and CLTV ratio. Standard errors are clustered
by underwriter; the estimates are in percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.

(1)
Misreported NonOwner-Occupancy
1.319*
(1.75)

(2)
Misreported Second

(3)
Either Misreported

0.546
(0.21)

1.528
(1.20)

Underwriter Years in
Subprime (Post-1999)

-0.0341
(-0.22)

-0.299
(-0.55)

-0.200
(-0.93)

Commercial Bank
Underwriter

-0.464
(-0.85)

-0.0161
(-0.01)

-0.110
(-0.09)

RMI

-0.581
(-0.72)

-0.434
(-0.13)

-0.636
(-0.35)

Bonus to Salary Ratio

-0.00423
(-0.39)

-0.0126
(-0.24)

-0.0141
(-0.50)

Half-Year Origination
Cohorts

Yes

Yes

Yes

Other Controls
Number of Loans
Percent Misrepresented
R-squared

Yes
1561625
6.426
0.0304

Yes
853954
7.131
0.0672

Yes
1700264
9.192
0.0401

Underwriter RMBS
Volume/Assets
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Table 11: Misrepresentations among New Century Loans
Panel A examines merged New Century loans identified as having a misrepresentation using the BlackBox-Equifax
merged dataset and presents the percentage of these that have the same misrepresentation reported in the New
Century dataset. Panels B and C of the table present summary statistics of key variables for New Century loans
reported as for owner-occupants and reported as having no second lien to the RMBS trustees, respectively, that have
been merged into the New Century dataset.
Panel A: Misrepresentations in New Century Data

Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant Reported as NonOwner-Occupant in New Century Dataset
Misreported Second Lien Reported as Having a Second
Lien in New Century Dataset

Percentage
0%

Count
148

93.28%

1279

Panel B: Characteristics based on Owner-Occupancy Status in Merged Data
Reported as
Identified by us as Having
Owner-Occupant
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupancy
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Default within 2 Years
0.210
0.408
0.345
0.477
Interest Rate
8.222
1.140
8.236
1.269
FICO
617.7
58.12
656.3
67.32
Number of Loans
3,160
148

Panel C: Characteristics based on Second Lien Status in Merged Data
Reported as Having
Identified by us as Having
No Second Lien
Misreported Second Lien
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Default within 2 Years
0.288
0.453
0.403
0.491
Interest Rate
8.409
1.356
7.642
1.082
FICO
594.9
55.65
645.2
41.69
Number of Loans
10,924
1,279
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Figure 1: Misrepresentations by State
Figures 1A and 1B provide mean levels of misrepresentation at the state level. Panel A displays these statistics for
Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant and Panel B displays these statistics for Misreported Second Lien measure.
Figure 1A: Fraction of Loans Reported as Owner-Occupied that Misreport Occupancy Status

Figure 1B: Fraction of Loans Reported as Having No Second Lien that Misreport Second Lien
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Figure 2: Cumulative Default Rates and Interest Rates
Panels A and B of the figure show the estimated cumulative default rates of a mortgage in the first two years since origination for different subsamples of the overall
dataset, holding constant at their overall sample mean all other observables used in Table 2, such as FICO and interest rate. In both panels, the y-axis is the
cumulative percentage of loans to have gone 90 days past due at least once. Panels C and D show the kernel density plots of the observed difference between actual
and predicted origination interest rates for different subsamples of the overall dataset. The predicted rates used in Panel C are given by a specification similar to that
used in Column (3) of Table 7A, with the Reported Non-Owner-Occupant and Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant variables removed. The predicted rates used in
Panel D are given by a specification similar to that used in Column (3) of Table 7B, with the Misreported Second x CLTV >= 100, Misreported Second x CLTV <
100, Reported Second x CLTV >= 100, and Reported Second x CLTV < 100 variables removed. In both panels, the x-axis shows the error term from these
regressions (the difference between the actual origination interest rate and the predicted value).

Panel A: Cumulative Default by Occupancy Status

Panel B: Cumulative Default by Second Lien Status
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Figure 2 (Continued):

Panel C: Interest Rate Error Terms by Occupancy Status

Panel D: Interest Rate Error Terms by Second Lien Status
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Figure 3: Misreported Non-Owner-Occupants by Underwriter
Figure 3 plots the percentage of misreported non-owner-occupants by underwriter along with a 95% confidence interval. Coefficients result from adding
underwriter fixed effects to the specification in Column (3) of Table 2A. These levels are obtained by adding each underwriter fixed effect to the level of
misrepresentation for the omitted category (Credit Suisse) with other covariates at their means.

58

Figure 4: Misreported Second Lien by Underwriter
Figure 4 plots the percentage of misreported second lien by underwriter along with a 95% confidence interval. Coefficients result from adding underwriter fixed
effects to the specification in Column (3) of Table 2B. These levels are obtained by adding each underwriter fixed effect to the level of misrepresentation for the
omitted category (Credit Suisse) with other covariates at their means.
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Figure 5: Either Misrepresentation by Underwriter
Figure 5 plots the percentage of loans with either misrepresentation by underwriter along with a 95% confidence interval. These levels are obtained by adding
each underwriter fixed effect to the level of misrepresentation for the omitted category (Credit Suisse) with other covariates at their means.
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Appendix A: Data
Verifying the Quality of the BlackBox-Equifax Merge
As we mentioned in Section 3, our primary dataset consists of a merge between (i) loan-level
mortgage data collected by BlackBox Logic and (ii) borrower-level credit report information
collected by Equifax. The merge was performed by Equifax using a proprietary merge algorithm
utilizing more than twenty-five variables. Equifax is one of the three largest credit bureaus in the
United States (along with Experian and TransUnion) and collects data on more than 400 million
consumers across the world. As such, it is one of the very few potential providers for such
detailed consumer credit data, and the firm has built a reputation based on data management. It
provides a variety of analytical tools, from fraud detection to portfolio analytics, to a diverse
group of client companies spanning multiple industrial sectors. Given Equifax’s background as a
data services company with over $1.5 billion in annual revenue, it certainly has the expertise to
perform the merge between the BlackBox and Equifax datasets. Nevertheless, as both of our
measures of underwriting misrepresentations rely directly on identifying discrepancies between
these two datasets, we also independently verify the quality of the merge.
Equifax reports a merge confidence measure that ranges from 0 to 0.90 (ranging from low to
high confidence). The majority of loans fall in the high-confidence buckets, such as between 0.8
and 0.81 or between 0.89 and 0.90 (see Table A1). To further verify the accuracy of the merge,
we compare the dynamic loan payment history reported to BlackBox to that reported to Equifax.
While BlackBox provides loan-level data, the Equifax data are reported at the consumer level
with statistics such as delinquencies either aggregated by debt product (first liens, HELOCs,
credit cards, etc.) or separated by account size and product (largest first lien, second largest first
lien, etc.). We restrict our analysis to consumers with only one first mortgage in Equifax so that
we can compare the correct payment records. 35 Additionally, we limit our analysis to
observations where the loan’s status in BlackBox is either current or 30, 60, or 90+ days
delinquent, as it can be difficult to correctly map other BlackBox statuses such as bankruptcy or
prepayment to a “correct” status in Equifax. We report the results in Table A2.
We find that for entire sample, the BlackBox and Equifax payment statuses exactly match 93.8%
of the time and are within 30 days of each other in 98.0% of cases. We include the second
measure to account for potential lags in reporting across the two databases. We observe that
status-matching rates increase monotonically with Equifax’s confidence measure, with only
0.3% of the highest confidence loans having significantly different BlackBox and Equifax
delinquency statuses. It is worth noting that among loans with a confidence measure of 0.89 or
35

Consider a borrower that has two first mortgages: we would observe the delinquency status of both mortgages, but
we would have to make assumptions regarding which status corresponded to the matched BlackBox loan.
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greater, about 16% of loans do not have matching BlackBox and Equifax zip codes. 36 This
reinforces the notion that Equifax uses unique identifiers in performing its merge, given the
difficulty of performing a merge across millions of loans without requiring a match on zip code.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the most reliable subsample of the merged data
consists of loans with a confidence of 0.89 or higher (44.4% of the sample). For the owneroccupancy analysis, this results in a sample of 1,563,223 mortgages, down from 3,549,858 loans
originated from 2005 to 2007 that are reported to BlackBox as owner-occupied (a 55.96%
reduction). For the analysis of misreported second liens, this results in a sample of 854,959
mortgages, down from 1,759,519 loans originated from 2005 to 2007 that are reported as having
no second liens in BlackBox (a 51.41% reduction).
Next, we examine how restricting to loans with a high Equifax merge confidence impacts our
sample. In Panel A of Table A3 we display summary statistics for loans reported as owneroccupied in the BlackBox dataset. The first two columns report these statistics for all loans in the
BlackBox dataset that are reported as owner-occupied. The last two columns report statistics for
the subsample of these loans limited to mortgages with highest Equifax merge confidence (0.89
or higher). On average, loans in the high-quality merged sample have somewhat higher quality
observable characteristics. In particular, these loans have lower interest rates, lower CLTV ratios,
and higher FICO scores and origination balances. Figure A1 displays kernel density plots
comparing this high-quality merged sample to the sample of BlackBox loans with reported
owner-occupied status that do not meet the merge confidence restriction. We see that despite the
differences in mean values, the two samples have similar underlying distributions of important
observable characteristics.
We repeat this sample comparison analysis for sample of loans that report no presence of second
liens. Panel B of Table A3 reports statistics for loans for which BlackBox reports that the CLTV
and LTV are equal. The first two columns report these statistics without any restrictions, while
the last two columns report the statistics for high-quality merged sample. Again, imposing these
restrictions leads to a sample with slightly higher quality observables. FICO scores and
origination balances increase, while interest rates and CLTV decrease. Figure A2 displays kernel
density plots comparing the merged sample with a sample of loans with no reported second liens
in the BlackBox that do not meet the Equifax merge confidence restrictions. Again, the shapes of
the distributions are quite similar, demonstrating that these two samples are also not
meaningfully different.
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to assess whether there is a relationship between incorrectly
merged records and the subsequent performance of the loans. To identify incorrectly merged
36

This group of loans includes mortgages reported to investors as for non-owner-occupied properties.
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records, we utilize the origination loan balances that Equifax reports each month for the
borrower’s two largest active first mortgages. We compare these two amounts over the loan’s
first six observations to the origination loan balance reported by BlackBox to construct the
Balance Mismatch variable, which takes the value of 1 if neither Equifax balance is ever within
two percent of the BlackBox origination balance and is zero otherwise. 37 We note that the
balance of the securitized first mortgage is unlikely to be misreported to investors because
servicers verify and report on a monthly basis outstanding loan amount and payments to the
securitization trust; hence, such records may indicate incorrectly merged loans across the two
databases. Because only two largest mortgage balances are reported in Equifax database, we
remove borrowers that have three or more first mortgages reported in their credit file. The reason
is that we are not sure if the loan in BlackBox would be part of the two largest mortgage
balances that are reported in the Equifax database.
We find that 2.01% of the loans have mismatched origination loan balances. To examine the
relationship between default likelihood and incorrectly merged records, we run an OLS
regression where the dependent variable is the same 90-day delinquency dummy variable used in
Table 5. The right hand variables include Balance Mismatch, the two previous misrepresentation
measures, origination cohort fixed effects, and the same vector of controls used in prior loanlevel regressions. Column (2) clusters standard errors by state level.
Table A4 reports the results. While we observe a small positive coefficient for Balance
Mismatch, the effect is economically small relative to what we find for our primary variables.
Moreover, the effect is not statistically significant when standard errors are clustered at the state
level. This suggests that there is no economically meaningful relationship between the potential
merge accuracy of the two databases and subsequent loan performance. Importantly, the
inclusion of Balance Mismatch does not reduce the economic or statistical significance of the
misrepresentation variables. This evidence provides further support that our methodology allows
us to identify actual misrepresentations and does not reflect incorrectly merged records.
Constructing Underwriter-Level Measures
This subsection discusses the construction of the underwriter-level variables used in Table 10.
The measure of the relative importance of the RMBS underwriting business is constructed by
dividing the aggregate dollar value of non-agency RMBS underwritten by an underwriter in 2005
by the underwriter’s total assets as of the end of 2005, as reported by Compustat. This variable
has a mean of 0.243 and a standard deviation of 0.334. The years of experience in underwriting
subprime deals is a deal-level variable capturing the underwriter’s experience in the subprime
37

Results are quantitatively similar regardless of how we define Balance Mismatch, with respect to both the 6month time window and the strictness of the balance match (within 2%, 5%, $100, etc.).

63

MBS market. To construct this measure, we take each pool’s securitization year and subtract the
year that the deal’s underwriter entered the subprime MBS market, using ABSNet’s universe of
subprime MBS deals from 1999 onward. This variable has a mean of 5.98 and a standard
deviation of 1.45.
The commercial bank underwriter variable, which accounts for differences between commercial
and investment banks, is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the underwriter’s charter identifies it
as a commercial bank and is 0 otherwise. The underwriter bonus-to-salary ratio is computed by
dividing the cash bonus of each underwriter’s five highest paid executives by their base salary in
2005 (in some cases only information for top six highest paid executives is available and used).
This data comes from Computstat’s Execucomp database where available and is otherwise
constructed using firms’ public financial reporting. This variable has a mean of 14.98 and a
standard deviation of 15.53. The risk-management variable is the RMI index constructed by Ellul
et al. (forthcoming). The Risk Management Index (RMI), based on Ellul et al. (forthcoming), is
computed as the first principal component of the following six risk management variables: Credit
Risk Officer (CRO) is present, CRO is an executive, CRO is a top five executive, CRO
compensation centrality, Risk committee experience, and Active risk committee.
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Table A1: Distribution of Equifax Merge Confidence
The table shows the distribution of loans in the BlackBox dataset across the Equifax’s merge confidence level. No
loans have a reported merge confidence greater than 0.90.

Merge Confidence
[0.00,0.80)

Number
of Loans
3.6%

[0.80,0.81)

41.8%

[0.81,0.89)

10.2%

Highest Confidence Available:
[0.89,0.90)
Total

44.4%

100%

Table A2: Delinquency Status Matching by Equifax Merge Confidence
The table shows the fraction of observations with delinquency statuses that match or are within 30 days of each
other in BlackBox and Equifax. The sample is restricted to borrowers with only one first mortgage record in Equifax
and to observations where the loan’s status in BlackBox is either current or 30, 60, or 90 days delinquent. A “Status
Match” is defined as an exact match between the reported BlackBox and Equifax delinquency statuses. “Status
within 30 Days” is defined as two statuses that are less than 60 days apart, e.g. 90 days delinquent in BlackBox and
60 days delinquent in Equifax.

Merge
Confidence
[0.00,0.80)

Fraction Payment
Status
Match
0.841

Fraction Payment
Status
Within 30 Days
0.924

[0.80,0.81)

0.904

0.964

[0.81,0.89)

0.942

0.991

[0.89,0.90)

0.976

0.997
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Table A3: Comparison of Descriptive Statistics
The table presents a comparison of summary statistics of key variables. The first two columns of each panel present
statistics for all loans in a given sample, and the second two columns restrict to loans that have the highest merge
confidence. Panel A presents mortgages reported as for owner-occupied properties, while Panel B shows these
statistics for loans reported as having no second liens to the RMBS trustee.

Interest Rate
FICO
Balance
CLTV
Purchase
No Cash Out Refi
Cash Out Refi
Low or No Doc.
ARM
Option ARM
Number of Loans

Interest Rate
FICO
Balance
CLTV
Purchase
No Cash Out Refi
Cash Out Refi
Low or No Doc.
ARM
Option ARM
Number of Loans

Panel A: Sample of Loans Reported as for Owner-Occupied Properties
All Sample
Merged Sample
Mean
SD
Mean
6.990
1.947
6.605
662.6
74.95
680.2
291.0
254.2
324.6
84.33
11.44
83.72
0.483
0.500
0.496
0.149
0.356
0.136
0.360
0.480
0.358
0.419
0.493
0.463
0.606
0.489
0.527
0.0991
0.299
0.103
3,549,858
1,563,223

SD
2.024
73.20
248.3
11.71
0.500
0.343
0.480
0.499
0.499
0.304

Panel B: Sample of Loans Reported as Having No Second Liens
All Sample
Merged Sample
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
6.925
2.236
6.458
2.424
652.8
76.48
663.5
76.90
277.6
225.3
293.1
238.9
79.79
10.03
78.93
9.955
0.366
0.482
0.361
0.480
0.117
0.321
0.121
0.326
0.506
0.500
0.507
0.500
0.472
0.499
0.514
0.500
0.597
0.491
0.475
0.499
0.113
0.317
0.169
0.375
1,741,606
854,959
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Table A4: Balance Mismatch Placebo Table
The table presents the OLS estimates from regressions where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the loan
defaults (90+ days delinquent) in the first 2 years since origination and is zero otherwise. Balance Mismatch takes a
value of 1 if the origination loan balance reported by BlackBox is not within two percent of any first mortgage
origination loan balance reported to Equifax during the loan’s first six months, and is zero otherwise. Other Controls
include origination variables used in Table 2 such as FICO, interest rates, and LTV ratios. Squared and cubed terms
for FICO and CLTV ratio are also included to account for potential non-linear effects. The estimates are in
percentage terms; t-statistics are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Balance Mismatch

(1)
0.709***
(3.70)

(2)
0.709
(1.60)

Misreported Non-Owner-Occupant

7.485***
(60.55)

7.485***
(13.85)

Misreported Second

8.214***
(51.31)

8.214***
(9.56)

Other Controls

Yes

Yes

Half-Year Origination Cohorts

Yes

Yes

No
1487121
14.44
2.010
0.155

Yes
1487121
14.44
2.010
0.155

SEs Clustered by State
Number of Loans
Percent 90 DPD
Percent Balance Mismatch
R-Squared
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Figure A1: Comparability of Owner-Occupied Loans by Merge Restrictions – Kernel Density of Observables
The figure shows the kernel density plots for loan origination CLTV ratios (a), FICO credit scores (b), interest rates (c), and loan balances (d) among loans that are
reported as owner-occupied in the BlackBox dataset. The group of loans meeting the Equifax merge restrictions is represented by the solid line, and the group that
fails these restrictions is represented by the dashed line.

(a): Origination CLTV Ratios

(b): Origination FICO Scores

(c): Origination Interest Rates

(d): Origination Loan Balance
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Figure A2: Comparability of Loans without a Second Lien by Merge Restrictions – Kernel density of observables
The figure shows the kernel density plots for loan origination CLTV ratios (a), FICO credit scores (b), interest rates (c), and loan balances (d) among loans that are
reported as not having any second liens in the BlackBox dataset. The group of loans meeting the Equifax merge restrictions is represented by the solid line, and the
group that fails these restrictions is represented by the dashed line.

(a): Origination CLTV Ratios

(b): Origination FICO Scores

(c): Origination Interest Rates

(d): Origination Loan Balance
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Appendix B: List of RMBS Lawsuits Fillings
This Appendix presents a list of recent lawsuits fillings regarding the material breach of representations and warranties by the underwriters and originators of
residential mortgage-backed securities. Lawsuits are organized by plaintiff and filing year. The 58 lawsuits presented here span the years 2008-2012 (2008 =4, 2009
= 5, 2010 = 9, 2011 = 35, 2012 = 5).
Filed by Insurers
Filed in 2008. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York. No. 602825/08.
Filed in 2008. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Residential Funding Company, LLC, New York State Supreme Court, County of New York. No. 603552/08.
Filed in 2009. Financial Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 650736/09.
Filed in 2009. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Bank of America Corp., et. al., California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles., No. BC-4157572.
Filed in 2009. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. IndyMac, F.S.B., et al., District of Columbia District Court, No. 1:09-cv-01011.
Filed in 2009. Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 650042/09.
Filed in 2010. Ambac Assurance Corp., et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 651612/10.
Filed in 2010. Ambac Assurance Corp., et al. v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 600070/10.
Filed in 2010. Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 600070/10.
Filed in 2010. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, New York State Supreme Court, County of New York. No. 600837/10.
Filed in 2011. United Financial Casualty Co., et al. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., California Central District Court, No. 2:11-cv-04766.
Filed in 2012. MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Ally Financial Inc., et al., Minnesota District Court, County of Hennepin, No. 0:12-cv-02563.
Filed by Government
Filed in 2010. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., et al., California Northern District Court, No. 3:10-cv-03039.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Ally Financial Inc., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 1:11-cv-07010.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Bank of America Corp., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv06195.
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Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Barclays Bank PLC, et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06190.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Citigroup, Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06196.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 11-cv-06916.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No.
1:11-cv-06200.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Deutsche Bank AG, et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06192.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. First Horizon National Corp., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11cv-06193.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. General Electric Co., et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 1:11-cv-07048.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv06198.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. HSBC North America Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv06189.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv06188.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Merrill Lynch & Co., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06202.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Morgan Stanley, et al., New York State Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06739.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11cv-06201.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, et al., United States District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:11-cv01383.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. SG Americas, Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-06203.
Filed in 2011. Federal Housing Finance Agency v. UBS Americas, Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11-cv-05201.
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Filed in 2011. National Credit Union Administration Board v. Goldman Sachs and Co. et al., California Central District Court, County of Los Angeles, No. 2:11cv-06521.
Filed in 2011. National Credit Union Administration Board v. RBS Securities, Inc., et al., California Central District Court, County of Los Angeles, No. 2:11-cv05587.
Filed in 2011. National Credit Union Administration Board v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, et al., United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:11-cv02341.
Filed in 2011. National Credit Union Administration Board v. RBS Securities, Inc., et al, United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:11-cv-02340.
Filed in 2011. National Credit Union Administration Board v. Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC, United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:11-cv02649.
Filed in 2011. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Citigroup Global Markets, LLC, United States District Court, Southern District of new York, No. 11cv-07387.
Filed in 2012. National Credit Union Administration Board v. Barclays Capital, et al., United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:12-cv-02631.
Filed in 2012. National Credit Union Administration Board v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA), et al., United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:12-cv02648.
Filed in 2012. National Credit Union Administration Board v. UBS, et al., United States District Court, District of Kansas, No. 2:12-cv-02591.

Individual and Class Action Lawsuits
Filed in 2007. David H Luther, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, et al., California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, No. BC-380698.
Filed in 2008. New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, et. al v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08cv-5653.
Filed in 2008. Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi, et al. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, No. 08-cv-10841.
Filed in 2009. Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi, et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, No. 09-cv-01110.
Filed in 2010. Allstate Insurance Co., et al. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 10-cv-09591.
Filed in 2010. Footbridge Limited Trust, et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 09-cv-04050.
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Filed in 2010. Maine State Retirement System v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., United States District Court, Central District of California, No. 10-cv00302.
Filed in 2010. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., United States District Court, Central District of California, No. 2:10-cv07275.
Filed in 2011. American International Group, Inc., et al. v. Bank of America Corp., et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 1:11cv-06212.
Filed in 2011. Capital Ventures International v. UBS Securities LLC, et al., United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, No. 1:11-cv-11937.
Filed in 2011. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp., et al., United States District Court, District of
Massachusetts, No. 3:11-cv-30048.
Filed in 2011. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., et al., United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, No. 3:11cv-30047.
Filed in 2011. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Financial Products, et al., United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, No. 3:11-cv30044.
Filed in 2011. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Residential Funding Co., et al., United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, No. 3:11-cv30035.
Filed in 2011. National Integrity Life Insurance Co. v. Countrywide Financial Corp. et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No.
1:11-cv-08077.
Filed in 2011. The Union Central Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Credit Suisse Securities et al., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, No.
1:11-cv-02327.
Filed in 2011. Walnut Place LLC et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et al., New York Supreme Court, County of New York, No. 650497/11.
Filed in 2011. Western and Southern Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Countrywide Financial Corp. et al., United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio. No.
1:11-00267.
Filed in 2012. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Countrywide Financial Corp. et al., United States District Court. No. 2:12-cv-05122.
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